Related papers: Formal Verification of Probing Security via Condit…

We introduce Cryptis, an extension of the Iris separation logic that can be used to verify cryptographic components using the symbolic model of cryptography. The combination of separation logic and cryptographic reasoning allows us to prove…

Differential privacy is a promising approach to privacy preserving data analysis with a well-developed theory for functions. Despite recent work on implementing systems that aim to provide differential privacy, the problem of formally…

We propose a security verification framework for cryptographic protocols using machine learning. In recent years, as cryptographic protocols have become more complex, research on automatic verification techniques has been focused on. The…

Modern out-of-order processors face speculative execution attacks. Despite various proposed software and hardware mitigations to prevent such attacks, new attacks keep arising from unknown vulnerabilities. Thus, a formal and rigorous…

We consider the problem of specifying and proving the security of non-trivial, concurrent programs that intentionally leak information. We present a method that decomposes the problem into (a) proving that the program only leaks information…

In cryptography, secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols allow participants to compute a function jointly while keeping their inputs private. Recent breakthroughs are bringing MPC into practice, solving fundamental challenges for…

We consider the problem of how to verify the security of probabilistic oblivious algorithms formally and systematically. Unfortunately, prior program logics fail to support a number of complexities that feature in the semantics and…

This paper presents the first machine-checked proof of noninterference for a language with gradual information-flow control, thereby establishing a rock solid foundation for secure programming languages that give programmers the choice…

Large Language Models (LLMs) represent valuable intellectual property (IP), reflecting significant investments in training data, compute, and expertise. Deploying these models on partially trusted or insecure devices introduces substantial…

Automatic security protocol analysis is currently feasible only for small protocols. Since larger protocols quite often are composed of many small protocols, compositional analysis is an attractive, but non-trivial approach. We have…

This paper presents a methodology for temporal logic verification of discrete-time stochastic systems. Our goal is to find a lower bound on the probability that a complex temporal property is satisfied by finite traces of the system.…

Sequential logic locking has been studied over the last decade as a method to protect sequential circuits from reverse engineering. However, most of the existing sequential logic locking techniques are threatened by increasingly more…

Bounded verification has proved useful to detect bugs and to increase confidence in the correctness of a program. In contrast to unbounded verification, reasoning about calls via (bounded) inlining and about loops via (bounded) unrolling…

Logical inference algorithms for conditional independence (CI) statements have important applications from testing consistency during knowledge elicitation to constraintbased structure learning of graphical models. We prove that the…

We introduce a framework for reasoning about the security of computer systems using modal logic. This framework is sufficiently expressive to capture a variety of known security properties, while also being intuitive and independent of…

Modern circuits face various threats like reverse engineering, theft of intellectual property (IP), side-channel attacks, etc. Here, we present a novel approach for IP protection based on logic encryption (LE). Unlike established schemes…

Logic locking protects an IC from threats such as piracy of design IP and unauthorized overproduction throughout the IC supply chain. Out of the several techniques proposed by the research community, provably-secure logic locking (PSLL) has…

Security protocols often use randomization to achieve probabilistic non-determinism. This non-determinism, in turn, is used in obfuscating the dependence of observable values on secret data. Since the correctness of security protocols is…

Cache timing attacks allow third-party observers to retrieve sensitive information from program executions. But, is it possible to automatically check the vulnerability of a program against cache timing attacks and then, automatically…

Rigorous quantitative evaluation of microarchitectural side channels is challenging for two reasons. First, the processors, attacks, and defenses often exhibit probabilistic behaviors. These probabilistic behaviors arise due to natural…