Related papers: Real-Time Parallel Counterfactual Regret Minimizat…

Characterizing the performance of no-regret dynamics in multi-player games is a foundational problem at the interface of online learning and game theory. Recent results have revealed that when all players adopt specific learning algorithms,…

This paper considers repeated games in which one player has more information about the game than the other players. In particular, we investigate repeated two-player zero-sum games where only the column player knows the payoff matrix A of…

In the past decade, motivated by the putative failure of naive self-play deep reinforcement learning (DRL) in adversarial imperfect-information games, researchers have developed numerous DRL algorithms based on fictitious play (FP), double…

Extensive-form games provide a versatile framework for modeling interactions of multiple agents subjected to imperfect observations and stochastic events. In recent years, two paradigms, policy space response oracles (PSRO) and…

Iterated regret minimization has been introduced recently by J.Y. Halpern and R. Pass in classical strategic games. For many games of interest, this new solution concept provides solutions that are judged more reasonable than solutions…

Sequential learning with feedback graphs is a natural extension of the multi-armed bandit problem where the problem is equipped with an underlying graph structure that provides additional information - playing an action reveals the losses…

We consider a fair resource allocation problem in the no-regret setting against an unrestricted adversary. The objective is to allocate resources equitably among several agents in an online fashion so that the difference of the aggregate…

Regret minimization is a powerful tool for solving large-scale problems; it was recently used in breakthrough results for large-scale extensive-form game solving. This was achieved by composing simplex regret minimizers into an overall…

No-regret self-play learning dynamics have become one of the premier ways to solve large-scale games in practice. Accelerating their convergence via improving the regret of the players over the naive $O(\sqrt{T})$ bound after $T$ rounds has…

A celebrated result in the interface of online learning and game theory guarantees that the repeated interaction of no-regret players leads to a coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) -- a natural game-theoretic solution concept. Despite the…

We study reinforcement learning for two-player zero-sum Markov games with simultaneous moves in the finite-horizon setting, where the transition kernel of the underlying Markov games can be parameterized by a linear function over the…

We study strategy improvement algorithms for solving parity games. While these algorithms are known to solve parity games using a very small number of iterations, experimental studies have found that a high step complexity causes them to…

A celebrated connection in the interface of online learning and game theory establishes that players minimizing swap regret converge to correlated equilibria (CE) -- a seminal game-theoretic solution concept. Despite the long history of…

Optimizing the parallel training of large models requires exploring intra-operator parallelism plans for a computation graph that typically contains tens of thousands of primitive operators. While the optimization of parallel data…

Bargaining games, where agents attempt to agree on how to split utility, are an important class of games used to study economic behavior, which motivates a study of online learning algorithms in these games. In this work, we tackle when…

We develop provably efficient reinforcement learning algorithms for two-player zero-sum finite-horizon Markov games with simultaneous moves. To incorporate function approximation, we consider a family of Markov games where the reward…

We propose a new algorithm for adversarial multi-armed bandits with unrestricted delays. The algorithm is based on a novel hybrid regularizer applied in the Follow the Regularized Leader (FTRL) framework. It achieves…

We consider the problem of simultaneous learning in stochastic games with many players in the finite-horizon setting. While the typical target solution for a stochastic game is a Nash equilibrium, this is intractable with many players. We…

In game theory, imperfect-recall decision problems model situations in which an agent forgets information it held before. They encompass games such as the ``absentminded driver'' and team games with limited communication. In this paper, we…

Modeling strategic conflict from a game theoretical perspective involves dealing with epistemic uncertainty. Payoff uncertainty models are typically restricted to simple probability models due to computational restrictions. Recent…