Related papers: Social Welfare under Heterogeneous Time Preference…
Large-scale online recommendation systems must facilitate the allocation of a limited number of items among competing users while learning their preferences from user feedback. As a principled way of incorporating market constraints and…
This paper considers the problem of dividing agents among coalitions. We concentrate on Additively Separable Hedonic Games (ASHG's), in which each agent has a non-negative value for every other agent and her utility is the sum of the values…
The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into economic systems represents a transformative shift in decision-making frameworks, introducing novel dynamics between human and AI agents. This paper proposes a welfare model that…
We study one-sided matching problems where $n$ agents have preferences over $m$ objects and each of them need to be assigned to at most one object. Most work on such problems assume that the agents only have ordinal preferences and usually…
In this paper, we consider the problem of a Principal aiming at designing a reward function for a population of heterogeneous agents. We construct an incentive based on the ranking of the agents, so that a competition among the latter is…
Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of…
Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA) as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profiles resulting from repeated strategic manipulations. While…
In this work, we propose an axiomatic approach for measuring the performance/welfare of a system consisting of concurrent agents in a resource-driven system. Our approach provides a unifying view on popular system optimality principles,…
This paper is merged with arXiv:2107.08965v2. We refer the reader to the full and updated version. We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with 2-value additive valuations. Our goal is to find an…
Sequential allocation is a simple and attractive mechanism for the allocation of indivisible goods. Agents take turns, according to a policy, to pick items. Sequential allocation is guaranteed to return an allocation which is efficient but…
Several behavioral, social, and public health interventions, such as suicide/HIV prevention or community preparedness against natural disasters, leverage social network information to maximize outreach. Algorithmic influence maximization…
We study how to optimally design selection mechanisms, accounting for agents' investment incentives. A principal wishes to allocate a resource of homogeneous quality to a heterogeneous population of agents. The principal commits to a…
Sequential allocation is a simple and widely studied mechanism to allocate indivisible items in turns to agents according to a pre-specified picking sequence of agents. At each turn, the current agent in the picking sequence picks its most…
Individuals often navigate several options with incomplete knowledge of their own preferences. Information provisioning tools such as public rankings and personalized recommendations have become central to helping individuals make choices,…
We consider a general class of multi-agent games in networks, namely the generalized vertex coloring games (G-VCGs), inspired by real-life applications of the venue selection problem in events planning. Certain utility responding to the…
In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have…
A combinatorial market consists of a set of indivisible items and a set of agents, where each agent has a valuation function that specifies for each subset of items its value for the given agent. From an optimization point of view, the goal…
The use of dynamic pricing by profit-maximizing firms gives rise to demand fairness concerns, measured by discrepancies in consumer groups' demand responses to a given pricing strategy. Notably, dynamic pricing may result in buyer…
We consider a social planner faced with a stream of myopic selfish agents. The goal of the social planner is to maximize the social welfare, however, it is limited to using only information asymmetry (regarding previous outcomes) and cannot…
In social choice theory, anonymity (all agents being treated equally) and neutrality (all alternatives being treated equally) are widely regarded as ``minimal demands'' and ``uncontroversial'' axioms of equity and fairness. However, the ANR…