Related papers: Zero-determinant Strategy for Moving Target Defens…

This paper studies novel attack and defense strategies, based on a class of stealthy attacks, namely the zero-dynamics attack (ZDA), for multi-agent control systems. ZDA poses a formidable security challenge since its attack signal is…

Cybercriminals are moving towards zero-day attacks affecting resource-constrained devices such as single-board computers (SBC). Assuming that perfect security is unrealistic, Moving Target Defense (MTD) is a promising approach to mitigate…

Similar to the role of Markov decision processes in reinforcement learning, Stochastic Games (SGs) lay the foundation for the study of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and sequential agent interactions. In this paper, we derive…

This paper studies the deployment of joint moving target defense (MTD) and deception against multi-stage cyberattacks. Given the system equipped with MTD that randomizes between different configurations, we investigate how to allocate a…

Synthesizing near-optimal mixed strategies for zero-sum differential games (ZSDGs) has been a longstanding challenge. Existing research mainly focuses on characterizing the theoretical value function, while the practical design of…

This paper studies the problem of defending (1D and 2D) boundaries against a large number of continuous attacks with a heterogeneous group of defenders. The defender team has perfect information of the attack events within some time (finite…

Active Directory (AD) is the default security management system for Windows domain networks. We study a Stackelberg game model between one attacker and one defender on an AD attack graph. The attacker initially has access to a set of entry…

There has been significant recent interest in leader-follower security games, where the leader dominates the decision process with the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) strategy. However, such a leader-follower scheme may become invalid in…

Adversarial Patrolling games form a subclass of Security games where a Defender moves between locations, guarding vulnerable targets. The main algorithmic problem is constructing a strategy for the Defender that minimizes the worst damage…

Evolutionary game theory provides a mathematical foundation for cross-disciplinary fertilization, especially for integrating ideas from artificial intelligence and game theory. Such integration offers a transparent and rigorous approach to…

In Stackelberg security games when information about the attacker's payoffs is uncertain, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal defender commitment by interacting with the attacker and observing their best responses. In this…

Tit-for-Tat strategy is a strategy in repeated two-player symmetric games which imitates the previous action of the opponent. We show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy is a zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the expected…

Machine learning (ML)-based detectors have been shown to be effective in detecting stealthy false data injection attacks (FDIAs) that can bypass conventional bad data detectors (BDDs) in power systems. However, ML models are also vulnerable…

In security games, the solution concept commonly used is that of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the defender gets to commit to a mixed strategy. The motivation for this is that the attacker can repeatedly observe the defender's actions and…

Since Press and Dyson's ingenious discovery of ZD (zero-determinant) strategy in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, several studies have confirmed the existence of ZD strategy in repeated multiplayer social dilemmas. However, few…

Ensuring public safety in a Smart City (SC) environment is a critical and increasingly complicated task due to the involvement of multiple agencies and the city's expansion across cyber and social layers. In this paper, we propose an…

We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader…

In a Stackelberg game, a leader commits to a randomized strategy, and a follower chooses their best strategy in response. We consider an extension of a standard Stackelberg game, called a discrete-time dynamic Stackelberg game, that has an…

Repeated games have provided an explanation how mutual cooperation can be achieved even if defection is more favorable in a one-shot game in prisoner's dilemma situation. Recently found zero-determinant strategies have substantially been…

This paper analyzes stealthy attacks, particularly the zero-dynamics attack (ZDA) in networked control systems. ZDA hides the attack signal in the null-space of the state-space representation of the control system and hence it cannot be…