Related papers: Aggregate Stable Matching with Money Burning
We consider a system with $N$ parallel servers where incoming jobs are immediately replicated to, say, $d$ servers. Each of the $N$ servers has its own queue and follows a FCFS discipline. As soon as the first job replica is completed, the…
The paper investigates sufficient conditions on a differential inclusion which guarantee that the origin is a finite time stable equilibrium, namely a weak local one, a weak global one or a strong local one. The analysis relies on the…
Stable marriage of a two-sided market with unit demand is a classic problem that arises in many real-world scenarios. In addition, a unique stable marriage in this market simplifies a host of downstream desiderata. In this paper, we explore…
Mechanism design is studied for aggregating renewable power producers (RPPs) in a two-settlement power market. Employing an indirect mechanism design framework, a payoff allocation mechanism (PAM) is derived from the competitive equilibrium…
We develop a unified estimation and inference framework for dyadic network formation with individual fixed effects, covering both transferable-utility (TU) and nontransferable-utility (NTU) links under general link functions. Under NTU,…
Under non-exponential discounting, we develop a dynamic theory for stopping problems in continuous time. Our framework covers discount functions that induce decreasing impatience. Due to the inherent time inconsistency, we look for…
We study delay-independent stability in nonlinear models with a distributed delay which have a positive equilibrium. Such models frequently occur in population dynamics and other applications. In particular, we construct a relevant…
We investigate a suspension bridge model described by a nonlinear plate equation incorporating internal fractional damping and infinite memory effects. The system also includes a nonlinear source term that may induce instability. Using…
Many important initial value problems have the property that energy is non-increasing in time. Energy stable methods, also referred to as strongly stable methods, guarantee the same property discretely. We investigate requirements for…
Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a…
Static stability in economic models means negative incentives for deviation from equilibrium strategies, which we expect to assure a return to equilibrium, i.e., dynamic stability, as long as agents respond to incentives. There have been…
Capacitated network bargaining games are popular combinatorial games that involve the structure of matchings in graphs. We show that it is always possible to stabilize unit-weight instances of this problem (that is, ensure that they admit a…
We study competitive equilibria in the classic Shapley-Shubik assignment model with indivisible goods and unit-demand buyers, with budget constraints: buyers can specify a maximum price they are willing to pay for each item, beyond which…
This article proposes a characterization of admissions markets that can predict the distribution of students at each school or college under both centralized and decentralized admissions paradigms. The characterization builds on recent…
We present a general framework for matching with transferable utility (TU) that accommodates arbitrary heterogeneity without relying on the logit structure. The optimal assignment problem is characterized by tractable linear programming…
We obtain an exact necessary and sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium asset prices in infinite horizon, discrete-time, arbitrage free environments. Through several applications we show how the condition…
In this paper, we study decentralized decision-making where agents optimize private objectives under incomplete information and imperfect public monitoring, in a non-cooperative setting. By shaping utilities-embedding shadow prices or…
In this paper a unifying energy-based approach is provided to the modeling and stability analysis of power systems coupled with market dynamics. We consider a standard model of the power network with a third-order model for the synchronous…
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two…
Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. Classical notions of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik,…