Related papers: Aggregate Stable Matching with Money Burning
Efficient computability is an important property of solution concepts in matching markets. We consider the computational complexity of finding and verifying various solution concepts in trading networks-multi-sided matching markets with…
We propose a decentralized market model in which agents can negotiate bilateral contracts. This builds on a similar, but centralized, model of trading networks introduced by Hatfield et al. in 2013. Prior work has established that…
We derive a system of fixed-point equations for the equilibrium transfers in a class of one-to-one matching models with linear transferable utility. We then show that, when the degree of substitution between alternatives is bounded from…
We show that a large effective number of commodities can be a source of equilibrium stability and uniqueness: expanding substitution opportunities strengthens aggregate substitution effects. We study finite dated-commodity exchange…
We study the optimal investment problem for a continuous time incomplete market model such that the risk-free rate, the appreciation rates and the volatility of the stocks are all random; they are assumed to be independent from the driving…
In this paper, we consider a matroid generalization of the stable matching problem. In particular, we consider the setting where preferences may contain ties. For this generalization, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem…
We study stable allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods. The problem is well-known to be challenging, and rich enough to encode fundamentally unstable economies, such as the roommate problem. Our approach stems from…
We consider the model of a token-based joint auto-scaling and load balancing strategy, proposed in a recent paper by Mukherjee, Dhara, Borst, and van Leeuwaarden (SIGMETRICS '17, arXiv:1703.08373), which offers an efficient scalable…
We propose a generalized market equilibrium model using assignment game criteria for evaluating transportation systems that consist of both operators' and users' decisions. The model finds stable pricing, in terms of generalized costs, and…
This paper considers a semiparametric model of dyadic network formation under nontransferable utilities (NTU). NTU arises frequently in real-world social interactions that require bilateral consent, but by its nature induces additive…
We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which…
We explore stability and fairness considerations in decentralized networked markets with bilateral contracts, building on the trading networks framework [Hatfield et al., 2013]. In our trading network game, we show that a well-defined…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible objects to a set of rational agents where each agent's final utility depends on the intrinsic valuation of the allocated item as well as the allocation within the agent's local neighbourhood.…
This paper revisits the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium framework through the lens of effective trade, emphasizing the distinction between theoretical and realizable market interactions. We develop the Effective Trade Model (ETM), where…
We study stability notions for networked many-to-many matching markets with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Outcomes are formulated as joint distributions over characteristics of agents and contract choices.…
We analyze an ideal gas like models of a trading market. We propose a new fit for the money distribution in the fixed or uniform saving market. For the marketwith quenched random saving factors for its agents we show that the steady state…
We mathematically analyze a simple market model where trading at each point in time involves only two agents with the sum of their money being conserved and with neither parties resulting with negative money after the interaction process.…
In this paper, we investigate a practical demand side management scenario where the selfish consumers compete to minimize their individual energy cost through scheduling their future energy consumption profiles. We propose an instantaneous…
The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget constraints, which is present in practice. Motivated by this, we introduce the different variants of GSP…
We consider design of monetary mechanisms for two-sided matching. Mechanisms in the tradition of the deferred acceptance algorithm, even in variants incorporating money, tend to focus on the criterion of stability. Instead, in this work we…