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Tabled evaluation is a recognized and powerful technique that overcomes some limitations of traditional Prolog systems in dealing with recursion and redundant sub-computations. We can distinguish two main categories of tabling mechanisms:…

Sequential allocation is a simple mechanism for sharing multiple indivisible items. We study strategic behavior in sequential allocation. In particular, we consider Nash dynamics, as well as the computation and Pareto optimality of pure…

Convertible instruments are contracts, used in venture financing, which give investors the right to receive shares in the venture in certain circumstances. In liquidity events, investors may have the option to either receive back their…

When developing peer-to-peer applications on Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), a crucial decision is the selection of a suitable DLT design (e.g., Ethereum) because it is hard to change the underlying DLT design post hoc. To facilitate…

The successive generations of consensus algorithms have progressively shifted the performance bottleneck of blockchains to the execution layer. While recent works address this by parallelizing transaction execution, they often overlook the…

Bargaining games, where agents attempt to agree on how to split utility, are an important class of games used to study economic behavior, which motivates a study of online learning algorithms in these games. In this work, we tackle when…

In this paper, we present the Proportional Payoff Allocation Game (PPA-Game), which characterizes situations where agents compete for divisible resources. In the PPA-game, agents select from available resources, and their payoffs are…

This paper studies a class of network games with linear-quadratic payoffs and externalities exerted through a strictly concave interaction function. This class of game is motivated by the diminishing marginal effects with peer influences.…

Classical federated learning (FL) assumes that the clients have a limited amount of noisy data with which they voluntarily participate and contribute towards learning a global, more accurate model in a principled manner. The learning…

In this paper, we propose several solutions to the committee selection problem among participants of a DAG distributed ledger. Our methods are based on a ledger intrinsic reputation model that serves as a selection criterion. The main…

Mechanism design is studied for aggregating renewable power producers (RPPs) in a two-settlement power market. Employing an indirect mechanism design framework, a payoff allocation mechanism (PAM) is derived from the competitive equilibrium…

Combinatorial auctions (CA) are a well-studied area in algorithmic mechanism design. However, contrary to the standard model, empirical studies suggest that a bidder's valuation often does not depend solely on the goods assigned to him. For…

In collaborative human-robot order picking systems, human pickers and Autonomous Mobile Robots (AMRs) travel independently through a warehouse and meet at pick locations where pickers load items onto the AMRs. In this paper, we consider an…

The increasing prevalence of multi-agent learning systems in society necessitates understanding how to learn effective and safe policies in general-sum multi-agent environments against a variety of opponents, including self-play.…

This paper presents a new distributed algorithm that leverages heavy-ball momentum and a consensus-based gradient method to find a Nash equilibrium (NE) in a class of non-cooperative convex games with unconstrained action sets. In this…

This paper considers the scheduling of parallel real-time tasks with arbitrary-deadlines. Each job of a parallel task is described as a directed acyclic graph (DAG). In contrast to prior work in this area, where decomposition-based…

In this paper we present a feedback approach to the design of an attack mitigation policy for DAG-based Distributed Ledgers. We develop a model to analyse the behaviour of the ledger under the so called Tips Inflation Attack and we design a…

The security of any Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) depends on the safety of the network layer. Much effort has been put into understanding the consensus layer of DLTs. However, many network layer designs seem ad-hoc and lack a careful…

In this work, we study stochastic non-cooperative games, where only noisy black-box function evaluations are available to estimate the cost function for each player. Since each player's cost function depends on both its own decision…

We present CGAAL, our efficient on-the-fly model checker for alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) on concurrent game structures (CGS). We present how our tool encodes ATL as extended dependency graphs with negation edges and employs the…