Related papers: A Simple Method for School Choice Lotteries
In a typical school choice application, the students have strict preferences over the schools while the schools have coarse priorities over the students based on their distance and their enrolled siblings. The outcome of a centralized…
Many countries around the world, including Korea, use the school choice lottery system. However, this method has a problem in that many students are assigned to less-preferred schools based on the lottery results. In addition, the task of…
This paper studies general multi-unit probabilistic assignment problems involving indivisible objects, with a particular focus on achieving the fairness notion of equal treatment of equals (ETE) and satisfying various efficiency criteria.…
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an ex-ante envy-free lottery over envy-free up to one item (EF1) deterministic allocations. It has the following advantages over a recently proposed algorithm: it does not rely on the…
We address the following dynamic version of the school choice question: a city, named City, admits students in two temporally-separated rounds, denoted $\mathcal{R}_1$ and $\mathcal{R}_2$. In round $\mathcal{R}_1$, the capacity of each…
Ensembling is a popular method used to improve performance as a last resort. However, ensembling multiple models finetuned from a single pretrained model has been not very effective; this could be due to the lack of diversity among ensemble…
School choice is the two-sided matching market where students (on one side) are to be matched with schools (on the other side) based on their mutual preferences. The classical algorithm to solve this problem is the celebrated deferred…
Using school choice as a motivating example, we introduce a stylized model of a many-to-one matching market where the clearinghouse aims to implement contingent priorities, i.e., priorities that depend on the current assignment, to…
We study the problem of finding solutions to the stable matching problem that are robust to errors in the input and we obtain a polynomial time algorithm for a special class of errors. In the process, we also initiate work on a new…
This paper provides effective methods for the polyhedral formulation of impartial finite combinatorial games as lattice games. Given a rational strategy for a lattice game, a polynomial time algorithm is presented to decide (i) whether a…
We propose a new single-winner election method ("Schulze method") and prove that it satisfies many academic criteria (e.g. monotonicity, reversal symmetry, resolvability, independence of clones, Condorcet criterion, k-consistency,…
This paper has two objectives. One is to give a linear time algorithm that solves the stable roommates problem (i.e., obtains one stable matching) using the stable marriage problem. The idea is that a stable matching of a roommate instance…
In this work we consider a simple, approximate, tending toward exact, solution of the system of two usual Lotka-Volterra differential equations. Given solution is obtained by an iterative method. In any finite approximation order of this…
Ensuring efficiency and envy-freeness in allocating indivisible goods without money often requires randomization. However, existing combinatorial assignment mechanisms (for applications such as course allocation, food banks, and refugee…
For a single event with finitely many mutually exclusive outcomes, the full Kelly problem is to maximize expected log wealth over nonnegative stakes together with an optional cash position. The optimal formula is classical, but the…
We consider the problem of fairly dividing indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. It is known that an Epistemic EFX and $2/3$-MMS allocation can be obtained using the Envy-Cycle-Elimination (ECE) algorithm. In this work,…
In this paper, we study fairness in committee selection problems. We consider a general notion of fairness via stability: A committee is stable if no coalition of voters can deviate and choose a committee of proportional size, so that all…
In the celebrated stable-matching problem, there are two sets of agents M and W, and the members of M only have preferences over the members of W and vice versa. It is usually assumed that each member of M and W is a single entity. However,…
Competitive selection processes, from scientific funding to admissions and hiring, use evaluations to score candidates, and eventually choose a subset of them based on those scores. Recently, many organizations have adopted partial…
We examine a controlled school choice model where students are categorized into different types, and the distribution of these types within a school influences its priority structure. This study provides a general framework that integrates…