Related papers: A Simple Method for School Choice Lotteries
We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. In some sense, the committee scoring rules in this class are multiwinner analogues of the single-winner Plurality rule, which is uniquely…
The choice titration procedure presents a subject with a repeated choice between a standard option that always provides the same reward and an adjusting option for which the reward schedule is adjusted based on the subjects previous…
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an important solution concept in game theory which has been applied frequently to biological models. Informally an ESS is a strategy that if followed by the population cannot be taken over by a…
The stable allocation problem is one of the broadest extensions of the well-known stable marriage problem. In an allocation problem, edges of a bipartite graph have capacities and vertices have quotas to fill. Here we investigate the case…
In this paper, we consider a matroid generalization of the stable matching problem. In particular, we consider the setting where preferences may contain ties. For this generalization, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem…
We propose prioritized unit propagation with periodic resetting, which is a simple but surprisingly effective algorithm for solving random SAT instances that are meant to be hard. In particular, an evaluation on the Random Track of the 2017…
We consider a many-to-one variant of the stable matching problem. More concretely, we consider the variant of the stable matching problem where one side has a matroid constraint. Furthermore, we consider the situation where the preference…
Single-elimination (SE) tournaments are a popular format used in competitive environments and decision making. Algorithms for SE tournament manipulation have been an active topic of research in recent years. In this paper, we initiate the…
The stable allocation problem is a many-to-many generalization of the well-known stable marriage problem, where we seek a bipartite assignment between, say, jobs (of varying sizes) and machines (of varying capacities) that is "stable" based…
Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of ``yea''…
This paper deals with the polynomial linear system solving with errors (PLSwE) problem. Specifically, we focus on the evaluation-interpolation technique for solving polynomial linear systems and we assume that errors can occur in the…
Approval-Based Committee (ABC) rules are an important tool for choosing a fair set of candidates when given the preferences of a collection of voters. Though finding a winning committee for many ABC rules is NP-hard, natural variations for…
Energy games belong to a class of turn-based two-player infinite-duration games}played on a weighted directed graph. It is one of the rare and intriguing combinatorial problems that lie in ${\sf NP} \cap {\sf co\mbox{-}NP}$, but are not…
With very few exceptions, recent research in fair division has mostly focused on deterministic allocations. Deviating from this trend, we study the fairness notion of interim envy-freeness (iEF) for lotteries over allocations, which serves…
We classify general systems of polynomial equations with a single solution, or, equivalently, collections of lattice polytopes of minimal positive mixed volume. As a byproduct, this classification provides an algorithm to evaluate the…
We study the classic problem of dividing a collection of indivisible resources in a fair and efficient manner among a set of agents having varied preferences. Pareto optimality is a standard notion of economic efficiency, which states that…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
All simple translation-invariant valuations on polytopes are classified. As a direct consequence the well-known conditions for translative-equidecomposability are recovered. Furthermore, a simplified proof of the classification of…
In common-interest stochastic games all players receive an identical payoff. Players participating in such games must learn to coordinate with each other in order to receive the highest-possible value. A number of reinforcement learning…