Related papers: Strategy-proof and Efficient Job Matching with Par…
Linear contracts are ubiquitous in practice, yet optimal contract theory often prescribes complex, nonlinear structures. We provide a distributional robustness justification for linear contracts. We study a principal-agent problem where the…
How to incentivize strategic workers using limited budget is a very fundamental problem for crowdsensing systems; nevertheless, since the sensing abilities of the workers may not always be known as prior knowledge due to the diversities of…
We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures many common economic situations, and yet it has not been studied, to our…
Information sharing among organizations has been gaining attention as a method for improving cybersecurity. However, the associated disclosure costs act as deterrents for firms' voluntary cooperation. In this work, we take a game-theoretic…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
Multi-agent systems extend large language models (LLMs) by decomposing tasks among specialized agents, but their distributed decision process creates new attack surfaces. We identify semantic hijacking, an attack in which harmful requests…
Dynamic mechanism design has garnered significant attention from both computer scientists and economists in recent years. By allowing agents to interact with the seller over multiple rounds, where agents' reward functions may change with…
Context: Combinatorial testing strategies have lately received a lot of attention as a result of their diverse applications. In its simple form, a combinatorial strategy can reduce several input parameters (configurations) of a system into…
We study the problem of scheduling $m$ tasks to $n$ selfish, unrelated machines in order to minimize the makespan, where the execution times are independent random variables, identical across machines. We show that the VCG mechanism, which…
We study contract design for welfare maximization in the well known "common agency" model of [Bernheim and Whinston, 1986]. This model combines the challenges of coordinating multiple principals with the fundamental challenge of contract…
Recent advancements in the Generative Reward Model (GRM) have demonstrated its potential to enhance the reasoning abilities of LLMs through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. Despite these gains, existing implementations of GRM suffer from…
Many companies now use crowdsourcing to leverage external (as well as internal) crowds to perform specialized work, and so methods of improving efficiency are critical. Tasks in crowdsourcing systems with specialized work have multiple…
We study mechanism which operate on ordinal preference information (i.e., rank ordered lists of alternatives) on the full domain of weak preferences that admits indifferences. We present a novel decomposition of strategyproofness into three…
We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…
We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. These are problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme in order to incentivize some agents to take costly, unobservable actions that lead…
This paper introduces a model of multi-unit organizations with either static structures, i.e., they are designed top-down following classical approaches to organizational design, or dynamic structures, i.e., the structures emerge over time…
Self-organization in complex systems is a process in which randomness is reduced and emergent structures appear that allow the system to function in a more competitive way with other states of the system or with other systems. It occurs…
When an individual's behavior has rational characteristics, this may lead to irrational collective actions for the group. A wide range of organisms from animals to humans often evolve the social attribute of cooperation to meet this…
We show that, in large population games, decentralized information aggregation generically corrects for individual-level biases. This establishes a new testable aggregate efficiency benchmark where the behavior of boundedly rational agents…
We study a general task allocation problem, involving multiple agents that collaboratively accomplish tasks and where agents may fail to successfully complete the tasks assigned to them (known as execution uncertainty). The goal is to…