Related papers: Induced Stackelberg Equilibrium Seeking via Iterat…
We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of $m$ priceable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader's decision one or more…
A Stackelberg game is played between a leader and a follower. The leader first chooses an action, then the follower plays his best response. The goal of the leader is to pick the action that will maximize his payoff given the follower's…
In this work, we use a Stackelberg infinite discrete-time dynamic game model to study the optimal supply schedule and the optimal demand response under a market-driven dynamic price. A two-layer optimization framework is established. At the…
We initiate the study of how to perturb the reward in a zero-sum Markov game with two players to induce a desirable Nash equilibrium, namely arbitrating. Such a problem admits a bi-level optimization formulation. The lower level requires…
The design of Nash equilibrium seeking strategies for games in which the involved players are of second-order integrator-type dynamics is investigated in this paper. Noticing that velocity signals are usually noisy or not available for…
In this paper, we consider a Nash equilibrium seeking problem for a class of high-order multi-agent systems with unknown dynamics. Different from existing results for single integrators, we aim to steer the outputs of this class of…
The multilevel reverse Stackelberg game is considered. In this game, the leader controls the outcome by announcing a strategy as a function of decision variables of the followers to his/her own decision space. Corresponding to the leader's…
We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…
Real-world games, which concern imperfect information, multiple players, and simultaneous moves, are less frequently discussed in the existing literature of game theory. While reinforcement learning (RL) provides a general framework to…
In security games, the solution concept commonly used is that of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the defender gets to commit to a mixed strategy. The motivation for this is that the attacker can repeatedly observe the defender's actions and…
We consider potential games with mixed-integer variables, for which we propose two distributed, proximal-like equilibrium seeking algorithms. Specifically, we focus on two scenarios: i) the underlying game is generalized ordinal and the…
Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. As opposed to the weak Stackelberg equilibrium (WSE), the SSE assumes that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader and this is…
Guided cooperation allows intelligent agents with heterogeneous capabilities to work together by following a leader-follower type of interaction. However, the associated control problem becomes challenging when the leader agent does not…
We propose a new variant of the strategic classification problem: a principal reveals a classifier, and $n$ agents report their (possibly manipulated) features to be classified. Motivated by real-world applications, our model crucially…
While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash…
We design a computational approach to find equilibria in a class of Nash games possessing a hierarchical structure. By using tools from mixed-integer optimization and the characterization of variational equilibria in terms of the…
Solution methods for generalized Nash equilibrium have been dominated by variational inequalities and complementarity problems. Since these approaches fundamentally rely on the sufficiency of first-order optimality conditions for the…
This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method presented in [4] to…
This paper investigates strategic interactions within a three party deception security game involving a defender, an insider, and external attackers. We propose a robust deception mechanism where the leader manipulates game parameters…
In the literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding, focus has mainly been on solving a single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions -- ranging from routing problems to online advertising auctions -- evolve…