Related papers: Induced Stackelberg Equilibrium Seeking via Iterat…
Standard Markovian optimal stopping problems are consistent in the sense that the first entrance time into the stopping set is optimal for each initial state of the process. Clearly, the usual concept of optimality cannot in a…
Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty regarding…
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…
The Stackelberg game model, where a leader commits to a strategy and the follower best responds, has found widespread application, particularly to security problems. In the security setting, the goal is for the leader to compute an optimal…
This paper proposes a novel approach for locally stable convergence to Nash equilibrium in duopoly noncooperative games based on a distributed event-triggered control scheme. The proposed approach employs extremum seeking, with sinusoidal…
In many settings of interest, a policy is set by one party, the leader, in order to influence the action of another party, the follower, where the follower's response is determined by some private information. A natural question to ask is,…
We study an infinite-horizon discrete-time optimal stopping problem under non-exponential discounting. A new method, which we call the iterative approach, is developed to find subgame perfect Nash equilibria. When the discount function…
Zero-sum stochastic games have found important applications in a variety of fields, from machine learning to economics. Work on this model has primarily focused on the computation of Nash equilibrium due to its effectiveness in solving…
In this paper, we introduce the third party to achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium with the time inconsistency in three different Stackelberg games, which are the discrete-time games, the dynamic games, and the mean field games. Here all…
Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm…
We introduce a reinforcement learning framework for economic design where the interaction between the environment designer and the participants is modeled as a Stackelberg game. In this game, the designer (leader) sets up the rules of the…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
Inverse game theory is utilized to infer the cost functions of all players based on game outcomes. However, existing inverse game theory methods do not consider the learner as an active participant in the game, which could significantly…
Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium…
In this paper, we are concerned with the stabilizatbility of Stackelberg game-based systems. In particular, two players are involved in the system where one is the follower to minimize the related cost function and the other is the leader…
Influential benchmarks incentivize competing model developers to strategically allocate post-training resources toward improvements on the leaderboard, a phenomenon dubbed benchmaxxing or training on the test task. In this work, we initiate…
Nash equilibria are defined using uncorrelated behavioural or mixed joint probability distributions effectively assuming that players of bounded rationality must discard information to locate equilibria. We propose instead that rational…
We study the problem of finding the Nash equilibrium in a two-player zero-sum Markov game. Due to its formulation as a minimax optimization program, a natural approach to solve the problem is to perform gradient descent/ascent with respect…
This work presents a novel policy iteration algorithm to tackle nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games arising naturally in many applications. Despite the obvious impact of solving such problems, there are no suitable numerical methods…
One key in real-life Nash equilibrium applications is to calibrate players' cost functions. To leverage the approximation ability of neural networks, we proposed a general framework for optimizing and learning Nash equilibrium using neural…