Related papers: An algebraic characterisation of Eve-positional la…
The $\omega$-power of a finitary language L over a finite alphabet $\Sigma$ is the language of infinite words over $\Sigma$ defined by L $\infty$ := {w 0 w 1. .. $\in$ $\Sigma$ $\omega$ | $\forall$i $\in$ $\omega$ w i $\in$ L}. The…
The evolution of language has been a hotly debated subject with contradicting hypotheses and unreliable claims. Drawing from signalling games, dynamic population mechanics, machine learning and algebraic topology, we present a method for…
We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an important solution concept in game theory which has been applied frequently to biological models. Informally an ESS is a strategy that if followed by the population cannot be taken over by a…
While value iteration (VI) is a standard solution approach to simple stochastic games (SSGs), it suffered from the lack of a stopping criterion. Recently, several solutions have appeared, among them also "optimistic" VI (OVI). However, OVI…
We study turn-based quantitative games of infinite duration opposing two antagonistic players and played over graphs. This model is widely accepted as providing the adequate framework for formalizing the synthesis question for reactive…
Static and dynamic equilibria in noisy binary choice (Ising) games on complete and random graphs in the annealed approximation are analysed. Two versions, an Ising game with interaction term defined in accordance with the Ising model in…
We introduce Visibly Linear Dynamic Logic (VLDL), which extends Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) by temporal operators that are guarded by visibly pushdown languages over finite words. In VLDL one can, e.g., express that a function resets a…
There are many combinatorial games in which a move can terminate the game, such as a checkmate in chess. These moves give rise to diverse situations that fall outside the scope of the classical normal play structure. To analyze these games,…
This paper studies the rationalization and identification of binary games where players have correlated private types. Allowing for correlation is crucial in global games and in models with social interactions as it represents correlated…
The best-response dynamics is an example of an evolutionary game where players update their strategy in order to maximize their payoff. The main objective of this paper is to study a stochastic spatial version of this game based on the…
The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many…
Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong generative capabilities but remain prone to inconsistencies and hallucinations. We introduce Peer Elicitation Games (PEG), a training-free, game-theoretic framework for aligning LLMs…
It is known that the Wadge reducibility of regular $\omega$-languages is efficiently decidable (Krishnan et al., 1995), (Wilke, Yoo, 1995). In this paper we study analogous problem for regular k-partitions of $\omega$-languages. In the…
We consider a non-zero-sum linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) dynamic game with asymmetric information. Each player observes privately a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world $V$, resulting in dependent private observations. We study…
In the context of strategic games, we provide an axiomatic proof of the statement Common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.…
This paper is a continuation of the study of topological properties of omega context free languages (omega-CFL). We proved before that the class of omega-CFL exhausts the hierarchy of Borel sets of finite rank, and that there exist some…
In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…
To build agents that can collaborate effectively with others, recent research has trained artificial agents to communicate with each other in Lewis-style referential games. However, this often leads to successful but uninterpretable…
In this paper we study two-player games with asymmetric partial observation and an energy objective. Such games are played on a weighted automaton by Eve, choosing actions, and Adam, choosing a transition labelled with the given action. Eve…