Related papers: Stackelberg Stochastic Linear-Quadratic Differenti…
In this paper, we consider a sequential stochastic Stackelberg game with two players, a leader and a follower. The follower has access to the state of the system while the leader does not. Assuming that the players act in their respective…
The closed-loop stability and infinite-horizon performance of receding-horizon approximations are studied for non-stationary linear-quadratic regulator (LQR) problems. The approach is based on a lifted reformulation of the optimal control…
A linear quadratic (LQ) stochastic optimization system involving large population, which is driven by forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE), is investigated in this paper. Agents cooperate with each other to minimize the…
In this paper, we continue our study on a general time-inconsistent stochastic linear--quadratic (LQ) control problem originally formulated in [6]. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium controls via a flow of…
In this paper, we present a novel method for computing the optimal feedback gain of the infinite-horizon Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) problem via an ordinary differential equation. We introduce a novel continuous-time Bellman error,…
This paper investigates the stochastic linear quadratic (LQ, for short) optimal control problem of Markov regime switching system. The representation of the cost functional for the stochastic LQ optimal control problem of Markov regime…
We study reinforcement learning (RL) for learning a Quantal Stackelberg Equilibrium (QSE) in an episodic Markov game with a leader-follower structure. In specific, at the outset of the game, the leader announces her policy to the follower…
Existing methods for learning Stackelberg equilibria typically assume that the followers' (variational, generalized) Nash equilibrium is unique. However, in the presence of multiple equilibria, without a selection convention, the problem…
We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…
This work is devoted to finding the closed-loop equilibria for a class of mean-field games (MFGs) with infinitely many symmetric players in a common switching environment when the cost functional is under general discount in time. There are…
We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader…
This paper introduces the new concept of (follower) satisfaction in Stackelberg games and compares the standard Stackelberg game with its satisfaction version. Simulation results are presented which suggest that the follower adopting…
We investigate the robust Stackelberg null controllability of a one-dimensional forward linear stochastic Kuramoto--Sivashinsky--Korteweg--de Vries (KS--KdV) equation. The control framework is formulated as a hierarchical Stackelberg game…
This paper provides a systematic study of the robust Stackelberg equilibrium (RSE), which naturally generalizes the widely adopted solution concept of the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE). The RSE accounts for any possible…
This paper proposes and studies a class of discrete-time finite-time-horizon Stackelberg mean-field games, with one leader and an infinite number of identical and indistinguishable followers. In this game, the objective of the leader is to…
This paper is concerned with a stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problem in a finite time horizon, where the coefficients of the control system are allowed to be random, and the weighting matrices in the cost functional are…
This paper is concerned with an optimal control problem for a forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE, for short) with a recursive cost functional determined by a backward stochastic Volterra integral equation (BSVIE, for…
Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty regarding…
An optimal control problem is considered for a stochastic differential equation with the cost functional determined by a backward stochastic Volterra integral equation (BSVIE, for short). This kind of cost functional can cover the general…
This paper is concerned with optimal control of stochastic fully coupled forward-backward linear quadratic (FBLQ) problems with indefinite control weight costs. In order to obtain the state feedback representation of the optimal control, we…