Closed-loop Equilibria for Mean-Field Games in Randomly Switching Environments with General Discounting Costs
Abstract
This work is devoted to finding the closed-loop equilibria for a class of mean-field games (MFGs) with infinitely many symmetric players in a common switching environment when the cost functional is under general discount in time. There are two key challenges in the application of the well-known Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and Fokker-Planck (HJB-FP) approach to our problems: the path-dependence due to the conditional mean-field interaction and the time-inconsistency due to the general discounting cost. To overcome the difficulties, a theory for a class of systems of path-dependent equilibrium Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations (HJBs) is developed. Then closed-loop equilibrium strategies can be identified through a two-step verification procedure. It should be noted that the closed-loop equilibrium strategies obtained satisfy a new form of local optimality in the Nash sense. The theory obtained extends the HJB-FP approach for classical MFGs to more general conditional MFGs with general discounting costs.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2403.00227,
title = {Closed-loop Equilibria for Mean-Field Games in Randomly Switching Environments with General Discounting Costs},
author = {Hongwei Mei and Son Luu Nguyen and George Yin},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.00227},
year = {2024}
}