Related papers: Strategic Facility Location with Limited Liars

We study the strategic purchasing of priorities in a time-dependent accumulating priority M/G/$1$ queue. We formulate a non-cooperative game in which customers purchase priority coefficients with the goal of reducing waiting costs in…

We consider a partially asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. All but one players have the same payoff functions, and one player (Player $n$) does not. Two strategic variables are $t_i$'s and $s_i$'s for each…

This paper addresses a class of network games played by dynamic agents using their outputs. Unlike most existing related works, the Nash equilibrium in this work is defined by functions of agent outputs instead of full agent states, which…

A multiclass queue with many servers is considered, where customers make a join-or-leave decision upon arrival based on queue length information, without knowing the scheduling policy or the state of other queues. A game theoretic…

The central result of classical game theory states that every finite normal form game has a Nash equilibrium, provided that players are allowed to use randomized (mixed) strategies. However, in practice, humans are known to be bad at…

In this paper, we study the Nash dynamics of strategic interplays of n buyers in a matching market setup by a seller, the market maker. Taking the standard market equilibrium approach, upon receiving submitted bid vectors from the buyers,…

We study deterministic mechanisms for the two-facility location problem. Given the reported locations of n agents on the real line, such a mechanism specifies where to build the two facilities. The single-facility variant of this problem…

We establish the existence of fixed points for set-valued maps defined on metric spaces and satisfying a pointwise or a local version of Banach's contraction property. As an application, we demonstrate the existence of Nash equilibrium in a…

Of paramount importance in both ecological systems and economic policies are the problems of harvesting of natural resources. A paradigmatic situation where this question is raised is that of fishing strategies. Indeed, overfishing is a…

In this paper, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a multi-player game is considered. The players are only aware of their own cost functions as well as the action space of all players. We develop a relatively fast algorithm within…

We construct Nash equilibria in feedback form for a class of two-person stochastic games of singular control with absorption, arising from a stylized model for corporate finance. More precisely, the paper focusses on a strategic dynamic…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent's cost function depends on all agents' strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm to learn a Nash equilibrium, whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at…

The theory of mean field games is a tool to understand noncooperative dynamic stochastic games with a large number of players. Much of the theory has evolved under conditions ensuring uniqueness of the mean field game Nash equilibrium.…

Facility location games have been a topic of major interest in economics, operations research and computer science, starting from the seminal work by Hotelling. In the classical pure location Hotelling game businesses compete for maximizing…

In this paper, I prove that existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in games with infinitely many players is equivalent to the axiom of choice.

We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…

We consider a market impact game for $n$ risk-averse agents that are competing in a market model with linear transient price impact and additional transaction costs. For both finite and infinite time horizons, the agents aim to minimize a…

We consider a new setting of facility location games with ordinal preferences. In such a setting, we have a set of agents and a set of facilities. Each agent is located on a line and has an ordinal preference over the facilities. Our goal…

We consider finite-state concurrent stochastic games, played by k>=2 players for an infinite number of rounds, where in every round, each player simultaneously and independently of the other players chooses an action, whereafter the…

Computing Nash equilibrium policies is a central problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning that has received extensive attention both in theory and in practice. However, provable guarantees have been thus far either limited to fully…