Related papers: Where Does MEV Really Come From? Revisiting CEXDEX…
In the context of blockchain, MEV refers to the maximum value that can be extracted from block production through the inclusion, exclusion, or reordering of transactions. Searchers often participate in order flow auctions (OFAs) to obtain…
This thesis develops equilibrium asset pricing models in incomplete markets with a large number of heterogeneous agents using mean field game theory. The market equilibrium is characterized by a novel form of mean field backward stochastic…
The MEV-Boost block auction contributes approximately 90% of all Ethereum blocks. Between October 2023 and March 2024, only three builders produced 80% of them, highlighting the concentration of power within the block builder market. To…
In the ever evolving landscape of decentralized finance automated market makers (AMMs) play a key role: they provide a market place for trading assets in a decentralized manner. For so-called bluechip pairs, arbitrage activity provides a…
The detection of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) in blockchain is crucial for enhancing blockchain security, as it enables the evaluation of potential consensus layer risks, the effectiveness of anti-centralization solutions, and the…
The Ethereum blockchain utilizes the EIP-1559 algorithm to manage transaction inclusion and block assembly. However, EIP-1559 and much of the existing literature study this problem from a static perspective, focusing on price evolution…
This study investigates the rapid centralization of the Ethereum builder market under the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) architecture. We argue that existing research, by focusing predominantly on influential order flows, lacks a…
Execution Tickets are currently discussed as a next evolutionary step in Ethereum's block space allocation mechanism, separating consensus rewards from execution rewards and selling execution rights through a dedicated market. We present a…
The rise of Ethereum and other blockchains that support smart contracts has led to the creation of decentralized exchanges (DEXs), such as Uniswap, Balancer, Curve, mStable, and SushiSwap, which enable agents to trade cryptocurrencies…
Consider a discrete-time infinite horizon financial market model in which the logarithm of the stock price is a time discretization of a stochastic differential equation. Under conditions different from those given in a previous paper of…
In this paper, we propose and study a novel continuous-time model, based on the well-known constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model, to describe the asset price process. The basic idea is that the volatility elasticity of the CEV model…
Maximal Extractable Value, or MEV, remains a structural threat to blockchain fairness because a block producer can often observe pending transactions and unilaterally decide their ordering or inclusion. Existing mitigations hide transaction…
Automated market makers (AMMs) are pricing mechanisms utilized by decentralized exchanges (DEX). Traditional AMM approaches are constrained by pricing solely based on their own liquidity pool, without consideration of external markets or…
Centralized stablecoins such as USDT and USDC enforce sanctions through contract-layer blacklist functions. Yet on public blockchains, a freeze is still an ordinary transaction competing with the sanctioned party's transfer for priority. It…
Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) face persistent challenges in liquidity retention and user engagement due to inefficiencies in conventional automated market maker (AMM) designs. This work proposes a dual-mechanism framework to address these…
The successive generations of consensus algorithms have progressively shifted the performance bottleneck of blockchains to the execution layer. While recent works address this by parallelizing transaction execution, they often overlook the…
Equity markets have long been regarded as unpredictable, with intraday price movements treated as stochastic noise. This study challenges that view by introducing the Extended Samuelson Model (ESM), a natural science-based framework that…
Participation in permissionless blockchains results in competition over system resources, which needs to be controlled with fees. Ethereum's current fee mechanism is implemented via a first-price auction that results in unpredictable fees…
Many cryptocurrency platforms are vulnerable to Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) attacks, where a malicious consensus leader can inject transactions or change the order of user transactions to maximize its profit. A promising line of…
Decentralized Exchanges (DEXes) enable users to create markets for exchanging any pair of cryptocurrencies. The direct exchange rate of two tokens may not match the cross-exchange rate in the market, and such price discrepancies open up…