Related papers: Where Does MEV Really Come From? Revisiting CEXDEX…
In blockchain systems operating under the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus mechanism, fairness in transaction processing is essential to preserving decentralization and maintaining user trust. However, with the emergence of Maximal…
The distribution of block maxima of sequences of independent and identically-distributed random variables is used to model extreme values in many disciplines. The traditional extreme value (EV) theory derives a closed-form expression for…
We analyze the market quality of centralized crypto exchanges (CEXs) and decentralized blockchain-based venues (DEXs) using a unique and comprehensive dataset. Focusing on two fundamental aspects, transaction costs and deviations from the…
We investigate the market microstructure of Automated Market Makers (AMMs), the most prominent type of blockchain-based decentralized exchanges. We show that the order execution mechanism yields token value loss for liquidity providers if…
An automated market maker (AMM) is a state machine that manages pools of assets, allowing parties to buy and sell those assets according to a fixed mathematical formula. AMMs are typically implemented as smart contracts on blockchains, and…
Permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin have excelled at financial services. Yet, opportunistic traders extract monetary value from the mesh of decentralized finance (DeFi) smart contracts through so-called blockchain extractable value…
Multi-block MEV (MMEV) denotes the practice of securing k-consecutive blocks in an attempt at extracting surplus value by manipulating transaction ordering. Following the implementation of pro-poser/builder separation (PBS) on Ethereum,…
In the ever evolving landscape of decentralized finance automated market makers (AMMs) play a key role: they provide a market place for trading assets in a decentralized manner. For so-called bluechip pairs, arbitrage activity provides a…
Blockchains, and specifically smart contracts, have promised to create fair and transparent trading ecosystems. Unfortunately, we show that this promise has not been met. We document and quantify the widespread and rising deployment of…
We study the amount of maximal extractable value (MEV) captured by validators, as a function of searcher competition, in blockchains with competitive block building markets such as Ethereum. We argue that the core is a suitable solution…
There has been a growing interest in shared sequencing solutions, in which transactions for multiple rollups are processed together. Their proponents argue that these solutions allow for better composability and can potentially increase…
We present a comprehensive analysis of the implications of artificial latency in the Proposer-Builder Separation framework on the Ethereum network. Focusing on the MEV-Boost auction system, we analyze how strategic latency manipulation…
This document analyzes price discovery in cryptocurrency markets by comparing centralized and decentralized exchanges, as well as spot and futures markets. The study focuses first on Ethereum (ETH) and then applies a similar approach to…
Asset exchange models (AEMs) provide a physics-inspired framework for studying wealth formation. These models capture wealth distribution dynamics via pairwise money exchanges, yielding steady-state distributions from exponential to…
This study analyzes proposer-builder data and MEV-Boost payment data following the Ethereum merge in September 2022 to identify patterns of multi-block MEV. Our findings reveal fewer multi-slot sequences of builders than predicted by a…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are a central component of decentralized exchanges, yet their equilibrium foundations and microeconomic mechanisms remain incompletely understood. This paper develops a dynamic equilibrium framework for…
Miner extractable value (MEV) refers to any excess value that a transaction validator can realize by manipulating the ordering of transactions. In this work, we introduce a simple theoretical definition of the 'cost of MEV', prove some…
This paper examines the impact of reducing Ethereum slot time on decentralized exchange activity, with a focus on CEX-DEX arbitrage behavior. We develop a trading model where the agent's DEX transaction is not guaranteed to land, and the…
Automated Market Maker (AMM)-based Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs) are crucial in Decentralized Finance (DeFi), but Ethereum implementations suffer from high transaction costs and price synchronization challenges. To address these…
Autonomous Market Makers (AMMs) rely on arbitrage to facilitate passive price updates. Liquidity fragmentation poses a complex challenge across different blockchain networks. This paper proposes FluxLayer, a solution to mitigate fragmented…