Related papers: Can a Weaker Player Win? Adaptive Play in Repeated…
A multi-variable adaptive controller is derived as the explicit solution to a minimax dynamic game. The minimizing player selects the control action as a function of past state measurements and inputs. The maximizing player selects…
In this paper, a hierarchical one-leader-multi-followers game for a class of continuous-time nonlinear systems with disturbance is investigated by a novel policy iteration reinforcement learning technique in which, the game model consists…
We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and…
We describe an approximate dynamic programming (ADP) approach to compute approximations of the optimal strategies and of the minimal losses that can be guaranteed in discounted repeated games with vector-valued losses. Such games…
We consider a version of the ultimatum game which simultaneously combines reactive and Darwinian aspects with offers in [0,1]. By reactive aspects, we consider the effects that lead the player to change their offer given the previous…
It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or…
We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…
We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium…
We consider a Bradley-Terry model in random environment where each player faces each other once. More precisely the strengths of the players are assumed to be random and we study the influence of their distributions on the asymptotic number…
In increasingly different contexts, it happens that a human player has to interact with artificial players who make decisions following decision-making algorithms. How should the human player play against these algorithms to maximize his…
Learning algorithms are often used to make decisions in sequential decision-making environments. In multi-agent settings, the decisions of each agent can affect the utilities/losses of the other agents. Therefore, if an agent is good at…
Player ONE chooses a meager set and player TWO, a nowhere dense set per inning. They play $\omega$ many innings. ONE's consecutive choices must form a (weakly) increasing sequence. TWO wins if the union of the chosen nowhere dense sets…
Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents' long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly…
Recent successes of game-theoretic formulations in ML have caused a resurgence of research interest in differentiable games. Overwhelmingly, that research focuses on methods and upper bounds on their speed of convergence. In this work, we…
We study a two-player, zero-sum, dynamic game with incomplete information where one of the players is more informed than his opponent. We analyze the limit value as the players play more and more frequently. The more informed player…
We study a class of deterministic finite-horizon two-player nonzero-sum differential games where players are endowed with different kinds of controls. We assume that Player 1 uses piecewise-continuous controls, while Player 2 uses impulse…
A multi-player competitive Dynkin stopping game is constructed. Each player can either exit the game for a fixed payoff, determined a priori, or stay and receive an adjusted payoff depending on the decision of other players. The single…
We introduce a simple class of mean field games with absorbing boundary over a finite time horizon. In the corresponding $N$-player games, the evolution of players' states is described by a system of weakly interacting It\^o equations with…
In this paper, we study a Target-Attacker-Defender (TAD) differential game involving one attacker, one target and multiple defenders. We consider two variations where (a) the attacker and the target have unlimited observation range and the…
Despite the considerable success enjoyed by machine learning techniques in practice, numerous studies demonstrated that many approaches are vulnerable to attacks. An important class of such attacks involves adversaries changing features at…