Related papers: Condorcet-loser dominance among scoring rules
Committee scoring rules form a rich class of aggregators of voters' preferences for the purpose of selecting subsets of objects with desired properties, e.g., a shortlist of candidates for an interview, a representative collective body such…
Answering an open question by Betzler et al. [Betzler et al., JAIR'13], we resolve the parameterized complexity of the multi-winner determination problem under two famous representation voting rules: the Chamberlin-Courant (in short CC)…
{\em Distortion} is a well-established notion for quantifying the loss of social welfare that may occur in voting. As voting rules take as input only ordinal information, they are essentially forced to neglect the exact values the agents…
When voter preferences are known in an incomplete (partial) manner, winner determination is commonly treated as the identification of the necessary and possible winners; these are the candidates who win in all completions or at least one…
In the celebrated stable-matching problem, there are two sets of agents M and W, and the members of M only have preferences over the members of W and vice versa. It is usually assumed that each member of M and W is a single entity. However,…
We consider collective decision making when the society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to the alternatives as a function of its members'…
In this paper we consider a Condorcet domain (CD) formed by a rhombus tiling as a voting design and consider a problem of aggregation of voting designs using majority rule. A Condorcet super-domain is a collection of CDs obtained from…
We study the committee selection problem in the canonical impartial culture model with a large number of voters and an even larger candidate set. Here, each voter independently reports a uniformly random preference order over the…
Typical voting rules do not work well in settings with many candidates. If there are just several hundred candidates, then even a simple task such as choosing a top candidate becomes impractical. Motivated by the hope of developing group…
We study the following refinement relation between nondeterministic state-transition models: model B strategically dominates model A iff every deterministic refinement of A is language contained in some deterministic refinement of B. While…
We study electoral campaign management scenarios in which an external party can buy votes, i.e., pay the voters to promote its preferred candidate in their preference rankings. The external party's goal is to make its preferred candidate a…
This paper introduces the axiom of Negative Dominance, stating that if a lottery $f$ is strictly preferred to a lottery $g$, then some outcome in the support of $f$ is strictly preferred to some outcome in the support of $g$. It is shown…
We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority from dominating minorities: whether a voting rule makes a majority powerful, and whether minorities can veto the candidates they do not prefer. For a given voting…
In the $(a,b)$-biased Maker-Breaker domination game, two players alternately select unplayed vertices in a graph $G$ such that Dominator selects $a$ and Staller selects $b$ vertices per move. Dominator wins if the vertices he selected…
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they…
Much research in electoral control -- one of the most studied form of electoral attacks, in which an entity running an election alters the structure of that election to yield a preferred outcome -- has focused on giving decision complexity…
The connected domination game was recently introduced by Borowiecki, Fiedorowicz and Sidorowicz as another variation of the domination game. The rules are essentially the same, except that the set of played vertices must be connected at all…
We present a class of orderings L for which there exists a profile u of preferences for a fixed odd number of individuals such that Borda's rule maps u to L.
Most of the stochastic orders for comparing random variables, considered in the literature, are afflicted with two main drawbacks: (i) lack of connex property and (ii) lack of consideration of any dependence structure between the random…
In 1876, Lewis Carroll proposed a voting system in which the winner is the candidate who with the fewest changes in voters' preferences becomes a Condorcet winner---a candidate who beats all other candidates in pairwise majority-rule…