Related papers: Online Temporal Voting: Strategyproofness, Proport…
For discrete-time linear systems subject to parametric uncertainty described by random variables, we develop a sampling-based Stochastic Model Predictive Control algorithm. Unlike earlier results employing a scenario approximation, we…
Sampling without replacement is a natural online rounding strategy for converting fractional bipartite matching into an integral one. In Online Bipartite Matching, we can use the Balance algorithm to fractionally match each online vertex,…
This paper studies a long-term resource allocation problem over multiple periods where each period requires a multi-stage decision-making process. We formulate the problem as an online allocation problem in an episodic finite-horizon…
We study the effect of public tallies on online elections, in a setting where voting is costly and voters are allowed to strategically time their votes. The strategic importance of choosing \emph{when} to vote arises when votes are public,…
In the setting of online learning, Implicit algorithms turn out to be highly successful from a practical standpoint. However, the tightest regret analyses only show marginal improvements over Online Mirror Descent. In this work, we shed…
We study online resource allocation under non-stationary demand with a minimum offline data requirement. In this problem, a decision-maker must allocate multiple types of resources to sequentially arriving queries over a finite horizon.…
We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting…
In social choice theory, anonymity (all agents being treated equally) and neutrality (all alternatives being treated equally) are widely regarded as ``minimal demands'' and ``uncontroversial'' axioms of equity and fairness. However, the ANR…
Let $v_n$ be the maximum expected length of an increasing subsequence, which can be selected by an online nonanticipating policy from a random sample of size $n$. Refining known estimates, we obtain an asymptotic expansion of $v_n$ up to a…
This paper addresses the abstract dynamic programming (DP) in the online scenario, where the abstract DP mapping is time-varying, instead of static. In this case, optimal costs and policies at different time instants are not the same in…
We consider fair division problems where indivisible items arrive one-by-one in an online fashion and are allocated immediately to agents who have additive utilities over these items. Many existing offline mechanisms do not work in this…
In this paper, I introduce a novel stability axiom for stochastic voting rules, called self-equivalence, by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself will choose not to do so. I then show that under the…
Since Downs proposed that the act of voting is irrational in 1957, myriad models have been proposed to explain voting and account for observed turnout patterns. We propose a model in which partisans consider both the instrumental and…
Perpetual voting studies fair collective decision-making in settings where many decisions are to be made, and is a natural framework for settings such as parliaments and the running of blockchain Decentralized Autonomous Organizations…
In this paper, we propose a framework to study a general class of strategic behavior in voting, which we call vote operations. We prove the following theorem: if we fix the number of alternatives, generate $n$ votes i.i.d. according to a…
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they…
We consider the optimal value of information (VoI) problem, where the goal is to sequentially select a set of tests with a minimal cost, so that one can efficiently make the best decision based on the observed outcomes. Existing algorithms…
Voting is the aggregation of individual preferences in order to select a winning alternative. Selection of a winner is accomplished via a voting rule, e.g., rank-order voting, majority rule, plurality rule, approval voting. Which voting…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem holds that dictatorship is the only Pareto optimal and strategyproof social choice function on the full domain of preferences. Much of the work in mechanism design aims at getting around this…
We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available…