Related papers: Adversarial Selection
In peer selection agents must choose a subset of themselves for an award or a prize. As agents are self-interested, we want to design algorithms that are impartial, so that an individual agent cannot affect their own chance of being…
We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the…
We consider a model where a subset of candidates must be selected based on voter preferences, subject to general constraints that specify which subsets are feasible. This model generalizes committee elections with diversity constraints,…
Proportional ranking rules aggregate approval-style preferences of agents into a collective ranking such that groups of agents with similar preferences are adequately represented. Motivated by the application of live Q&A platforms, where…
A simple mechanism for allocating indivisible resources is sequential allocation in which agents take turns to pick items. We focus on possible and necessary allocation problems, checking whether allocations of a given form occur in some or…
Given an undirected graph representing similarities between a set of items and an additive measure evaluating the items, we treat the position of a special subset of items in an ordinal ranking through a collection of combinatorial…
We revisit the problem of selecting an item from $n$ choices that appear before us in random sequential order so as to minimize the expected rank of the item selected. In particular, we examine the stopping rule where we reject the first…
We consider the problem of estimating assortment probabilities, which is common in operations management applications, including product bundling, advertising, etc. Existing approaches typically model each assortment as a category and apply…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
We study the problem of selecting limited features to observe such that models trained on them can perform well simultaneously across multiple subpopulations. This problem has applications in settings where collecting each feature is…
Ranking and comparing items is crucial for collecting information about preferences in many areas, from marketing to politics. The Mallows rank model is among the most successful approaches to analyse rank data, but its computational…
Multi-party learning provides solutions for training joint models with decentralized data under legal and practical constraints. However, traditional multi-party learning approaches are confronted with obstacles such as system…
This papers consists of two parts. The first is a critical review of prior art on adversarial learning, identifying some significant limitations of previous works. The second part is an experimental study considering adversarial active…
We consider a voting model, where a number of candidates need to be selected subject to certain feasibility constraints. The model generalises committee elections (where there is a single constraint on the number of candidates that need to…
Responses generated by neural conversational models tend to lack informativeness and diversity. We present Adversarial Information Maximization (AIM), an adversarial learning strategy that addresses these two related but distinct problems.…
We study the task of electing egalitarian sequences of $\tau$ committees given a set of agents with additive utilities for candidates available on each of $\tau$ levels. We introduce several rules for electing an egalitarian committee…
Quantum state filtering is a variant of the unambiguous state discrimination problem: the states are grouped in sets and we want to determine to which particular set a given input state belongs.The simplest case, when the N given states are…
Every representative democracy must specify a mechanism under which voters choose their representatives. The most common mechanism in the United States -- Winner takes all single-member districts -- both enables substantial partisan…
Quantile regression is a method to estimate the quantiles of the conditional distribution of a response variable, and as such it permits a much more accurate portrayal of the relationship between the response variable and observed…
The paper considers the problem of finding the number of dominant voters in two-level voting procedures. At the first stage, voting is conducted among local groups of voters, and at the second stage, the results are aggregated to form a…