Related papers: Session Risk Memory (SRM): Temporal Authorization …

Group-relative RL training (GRPO) samples a small group of parallel rollouts for every training prompt and uses their within-group reward spread to compute per-trajectory advantages. In agentic environments each rollout is a long multi-turn…

For LLM agents, memory management critically impacts efficiency, quality, and security. While much research focuses on retention, selective forgetting--inspired by human cognitive processes (hippocampal indexing/consolidation theory and…

Deploying large language model (LLM)-driven conversational agents in enterprise settings requires prompts that are simultaneously correct at launch and resilient to the non-deterministic behavioral drift that characterizes production LLM…

Agentic methods have emerged as a powerful and autonomous paradigm that enhances reasoning, collaboration, and adaptive control, enabling systems to coordinate and independently solve complex tasks. We extend this paradigm to safety…

We consider Parallel Random Access Machine (PRAM) which has some processors and memory cells faulty. The faults considered are static, i.e., once the machine starts to operate, the operational/faulty status of PRAM components does not…

Memory is a central capability for LLM agents operating across long-horizon tasks. Existing memory benchmarks predominantly evaluate retention of personalized information in multi-turn chat scenarios, overlooking the dynamic memory…

The development of Distributional Reinforcement Learning (DRL) has introduced a natural way to incorporate risk sensitivity into value-based and actor-critic methods by employing risk measures other than expectation in the value function.…

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly operate across domains such as robotics, virtual assistants, and web automation. However, their stochastic decision-making introduces safety risks that are difficult to anticipate during…

Contemporary approaches to agent-based modeling (ABM) of social systems have traditionally emphasized rule-based behaviors, limiting their ability to capture nuanced dynamics by moving beyond predefined rules and leveraging contextual…

When an LLM agent reads a confidential file, then writes a summary, then emails it externally, no single step is unsafe, but the sequence is a data leak. We call this safety drift: individually safe actions compounding into violations.…

Existing backdoor attacks on Large Language Model-based agents remain stateless, executing fixed behaviors confined to a single session. We propose a stateful agent backdoor that extends the attack lifecycle across multiple sessions under…

Safety-oriented instruction-following is supposed to keep LLM-controlled robots safe. We show it also creates an availability attack surface. By injecting short safety-plausible phrases (1-5 tokens) into a robots audio channel, an adversary…

Large language model (LLM) coding agents increasingly operate over repositories, terminals, tests, and execution traces across long software-engineering episodes. Persistent memory is useful, but static vector stores or generic…

We introduce a new memory architecture, Bayesian Relational Memory (BRM), to improve the generalization ability for semantic visual navigation agents in unseen environments, where an agent is given a semantic target to navigate towards. BRM…

LLM-based agents are deployed in safety-critical applications, yet current guardrail systems fail to prevent violations of temporal safety policies, requirements that govern the ordering and sequencing of agent actions. For instance, agents…

Existing AI agent safety benchmarks focus on generic criminal harm (cybercrime, harassment, weapon synthesis), leaving a systematic blind spot for a distinct and commercially consequential threat category: agents harming their own…

Proactive agents must decide not only what to say but also whether and when to intervene. Many current systems rely on brittle heuristics or indiscriminate long reasoning, which offers little control over the benefit-burden tradeoff. We…

Indirect prompt injection threatens LLM agents by embedding malicious instructions in external content, enabling unauthorized actions and data theft. LLM agents maintain working memory through their context window, which stores interaction…

How should an agent decide when and how to plan? A dominant approach builds agents as reactive policies with adaptive computation (e.g., chain-of-thought), trained end-to-end expecting planning to emerge implicitly. Without control over the…

Agentic language models operate in a fundamentally different safety regime than chat models: they must plan, call tools, and execute long-horizon actions where a single misstep, such as accessing files or entering credentials, can cause…