Related papers: Distribution-Free Equilibrium in Search Contests
We study a game between $N$ job applicants who incur a cost $c$ (relative to the job value) to reveal their type during interviews and an administrator who seeks to maximize the probability of hiring the best. We define a full learning…
In this paper we consider the problem of distributed channel allocation in large networks under the frequency-selective interference channel. Performance is measured by the weighted sum of achievable rates. First we present a natural…
Ensuring efficiency and envy-freeness in allocating indivisible goods without money often requires randomization. However, existing combinatorial assignment mechanisms (for applications such as course allocation, food banks, and refugee…
This paper considers information sharing in a multi-player repeated game. Every round, each player observes a subset of components of a random vector and then takes a control action. The utility earned by each player depends on the full…
This paper characterizes optimal classification when individuals adjust their behavior in response to the classification rule. We model the interaction between a designer and a population as a Stackelberg game: the designer selects a…
Mechanism design is a well-established game-theoretic paradigm for designing games to achieve desired outcomes. This paper addresses a closely related but distinct concept, equilibrium design. Unlike mechanism design, the designer's…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent's cost function depends on all agents' strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm to learn a Nash equilibrium, whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at…
This paper presents a comprehensive analytical study of two competitive cognitive operators' spectrum leasing and pricing strategies, taking into account operators' heterogeneity in leasing costs and users' heterogeneity in transmission…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of $m$ goods among $n$ agents in the asymptotic setting, where each item's value for each agent is drawn from an underlying joint distribution. Prior works have shown that if this distribution…
We consider a contest game modelling a contest where reviews for $m$ proposals are crowdsourced from $n$ strategic agents} players. Player $i$ has a skill $s_{i\ell}$ for reviewing proposal $\ell$; for her review, she strategically chooses…
We study the design of a decentralized two-sided matching market in which agents' search is guided by the platform. There are finitely many agent types, each with (potentially random) preferences drawn from known type-specific…
We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a consumer's visit will glean. In the unique symmetric equilibrium…
We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent bidders with arbitrary demand constraints when either the number of bidders is a constant or the number of items is a constant. In the first…
We extend the optimin notion of Ismail (2025) from mixed strategy profiles to correlated distributions. A correlated distribution is evaluated by the worst expected payoff each player can receive when opponents may either obey their private…
We propose a new dynamics for equilibrium selection of finite player discrete strategy games. The dynamics is motivated by optimal transportation, and models individual players' myopicity, greedy and uncertainty when making decisions. The…
This paper studies random reshuffling (RR)-based distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for noncooperative games. The game is motivated as a sample-average approximation of an underlying expected-value stochastic game, while the algorithmic…
In a multi-battle contest, each time a player competes by investing some of her budgets or resources in a component battle to collect a value if winning the battle. There are multiple battles to fight, and the budgets get consumed over…
We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to…
We provide a unified approach to find equilibrium solutions for time-inconsistent problems with distribution dependent rewards, which are important to the study of behavioral finance and economics. Our approach is based on {\it equilibrium…
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…