Related papers: Strategy-proof Market Segmentation against Price D…

We consider an economic environment with one buyer and one seller. For a bundle $(t,q)\in [0,\infty[\times [0,1]=\mathbb{Z}$, $q$ refers to the winning probability of an object, and $t$ denotes the payment that the buyer makes. We consider…

Data driven segmentation is the powerhouse behind the success of online advertising. Various underlying challenges for successful segmentation have been studied by the academic community, with one notable exception - consumers incentives…

Rather than directly predicting future prices or returns, we follow a more recent trend in asset management and classify the state of a market based on labels. We use numerous standard labels and even construct our own ones. The labels rely…

A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. The seller uses information to price discriminate the buyer. A designer offers a mechanism that provides the seller with additional information…

This note revisits the analysis of third-degree price discrimination developed by Bergemann et al. (2015), which characterizes the set of consumer-producer surplus pairs that can be achieved through market segmentation. This was proved by…

We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations in such settings can…

Central to privacy concerns is that firms may use consumer data to price discriminate. A common policy response is that consumers should be given control over which firms access their data and how. Since firms learn about a consumer's…

An important challenge in robust machine learning is when training data is provided by strategic sources who may intentionally report erroneous data for their own benefit. A line of work at the intersection of machine learning and mechanism…

We consider a feature-based personalized pricing problem in which the buyer is strategic: given the seller's pricing policy, the buyer can augment the features that they reveal to the seller to obtain a low price for the product. We model…

A platform charges a producer for disclosing quality evidence to consumers before trade. It aims to maximize its revenue guarantee across potentially multiple equilibria which arise from the interdependence of producer purchase decisions…

We present a strategy-proof public goods budgeting mechanism where agents determine both the total volume of expanses and the specific allocation. It is constructed as a modification of VCG to a less typical environment, namely where we do…

We study the dynamic pricing problem faced by a monopolistic retailer who sells a storable product to forward-looking consumers. In this framework, the two major pricing policies (or mechanisms) studied in the literature are the…

We consider a scenario where a retailer can set different prices for different consumers in a smart grid. The retailer's objective is to maximize the revenue, minimize the operating cost, and maximize the consumer's welfare. The retailer…

Pricing decisions are often made when market information is still poor. In turn, existing theoretical models often reason about the response of optimal prices to changing market characteristics without exploiting all available information…

Motivated by applications to word-of-mouth advertising, we consider a game-theoretic scenario in which competing advertisers want to target initial adopters in a social network. Each advertiser wishes to maximize the resulting cascade of…

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which…

We study multi-product monopoly pricing where the seller jointly designs the selling mechanism and the information structure for the buyer to learn his values. Unlike the case with exogenous information, we show that when the seller…

We develop a general framework for incorporating distributional preferences in market design. We identify the structural properties of these preferences that guarantee the path independence of choice rules. In decentralized settings, a…

We initiate the study of deep learning for the automated design of two-sided matching mechanisms. What is of most interest is to use machine learning to understand the possibility of new tradeoffs between strategy-proofness and stability.…

Problem definition: Traditional monopoly pricing assumes sellers have full information about consumer valuations. We consider monopoly pricing under limited information, where a seller only knows the mean, variance and support of the…