Multi-Dimensional Screening with Endogenous Information Disclosure
Computer Science and Game Theory
2025-10-29 v2
Abstract
We study multi-product monopoly pricing where the seller jointly designs the selling mechanism and the information structure for the buyer to learn his values. Unlike the case with exogenous information, we show that when the seller controls information, even uniform pricing guarantees at least half of the optimal revenue. Moreover, for negatively affiliated or exchangeable value distributions, deterministic pricing is revenue-optimal. Our results highlight the power of information design in making pricing mechanisms approximately optimal in multi-dimensional settings.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2502.17809,
title = {Multi-Dimensional Screening with Endogenous Information Disclosure},
author = {Yang Cai and Yingkai Li and Jinzhao Wu},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.17809},
year = {2025}
}