Related papers: Robust mean-field games under entropy-based uncert…
We introduce a class of robust control problems formulated in min-max form, in which the principal agent is viewed as a central planner facing Nature. The agent's cost is a nonlinear function of all its possible realizations, encompassing…
We consider N-player and mean field games in continuous time over a finite horizon, where the position of each agent belongs to {-1,1}. If there is uniqueness of mean field game solutions, e.g. under monotonicity assumptions, then the…
In this paper we propose two new monotonicity conditions that could serve as sufficient conditions for uniqueness of Nash equilibria in mean field games. In this study we aim for $unconditional\ uniqueness$ that is independent of the length…
We formulate a mean field game where each player stops a privately observed Brownian motion with absorption. Players are ranked according to their level of stopping and rewarded as a function of their relative rank. There is a unique mean…
Mean-field games (MFG) were introduced to efficiently analyze approximate Nash equilibria in large population settings. In this work, we consider entropy-regularized mean-field games with a finite state-action space in a discrete time…
This paper considers a class of mean field linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) games with model uncertainty. The drift term in the dynamics of the agents contains a common unknown function. We take a robust optimization approach where a…
We study discrete-time, finite-state mean-field games (MFGs) under model uncertainty, where agents face ambiguity about the state transition probabilities. Each agent maximizes its expected payoff against the worst-case transitions within…
This paper studies a discrete-time major-minor mean field game of stopping where the major player can choose either an optimal control or stopping time. We look for the relaxed equilibrium as a randomized stopping policy, which is…
We study mean field games and corresponding $N$-player games in continuous time over a finite time horizon where the position of each agent belongs to a finite state space. As opposed to previous works on finite state mean field games, we…
We formulate a stochastic game of mean field type where the agents solve optimal stopping problems and interact through the proportion of players that have already stopped. Working with a continuum of agents, typical equilibria become…
In this paper, we study a class of discrete-time mean-field games under the infinite-horizon risk-sensitive discounted-cost optimality criterion. Risk-sensitivity is introduced for each agent (player) via an exponential utility function. In…
The objective of this work is to study the existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibria in mean field games involving a major player and a continuum of minor players over finite intervals of arbitrary length. Following earlier…
Establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for partially observed stochastic dynamic games is known to be quite challenging, with the difficulties stemming from the noisy nature of the measurements available to individual players…
In this manuscript we derive a new nonlinear transport equation written on the space of probability measures that allows to study a class of deterministic mean field games and master equations, where the interaction of the agents happens…
In this paper, we introduce discrete-time linear mean-field games subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of a generic agent is a compact Borel space. At every time, each agent is randomly…
In stochastic dynamic games, when the number of players is sufficiently large and the interactions between agents depend on empirical state distribution, one way to approximate the original game is to introduce infinite-population limit of…
We consider a class of linear-quadratic-Gaussian mean-field games with a major agent and considerable heterogeneous minor agents in the presence of mean-field interactions. The individual admissible controls are constrained in closed convex…
We consider a class of Mean Field Games in which the agents may interact through the statistical distribution of their states and controls. It is supposed that the Hamiltonian behaves like a power of its arguments as they tend to infinity,…
We are interested in the study of stochastic games for which each player faces an optimal stopping problem. In our setting, the players may interact through the criterion to optimise as well as through their dynamics. After briefly…
We introduce a mean field model for optimal holding of a representative agent of her peers as a natural expected scaling limit from the corresponding $N-$agent model. The induced mean field dynamics appear naturally in a form which is not…