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We develop the fictitious play algorithm in the context of the linear programming approach for mean field games of optimal stopping and mean field games with regular control and absorption. This algorithm allows to approximate the mean…
This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg stochastic differential game on a finite horizon in feedback information pattern. A system of parabolic partial differential equations is obtained at the level of Hamiltonian to give the…
We develop a method based on computer algebra systems to represent the mutual pure strategy best-response dynamics of symmetric two-player, two-action repeated games played by players with a one-period memory. We apply this method to the…
We develop the theory of linear-quadratic (LQ) mean field games (MFGs) in Hilbert spaces with common noise modeled by an infinite-dimensional Wiener process that affects the dynamics of all agents. In the presence of common noise, the…
Dynamic game theory is a powerful tool in modeling multi-agent interactions and human-robot systems. In practice, since the objective functions of both agents may not be explicitly known to each other, these interactions can be modeled as…
Finding equilibria via gradient play in competitive multi-agent games has been attracting a growing amount of attention in recent years, with emphasis on designing efficient strategies where the agents operate in a decentralized and…
We consider an example of stochastic games with partial, asymmetric and non-classical information. We obtain relevant equilibrium policies using a new approach which allows managing the belief updates in a structured manner. Agents have…
We study a discrete-time finite-horizon two-players nonzero-sum stopping game where the filtration of Player 1 is richer than the filtration of Player 2. A major difficulty which is caused by the information asymmetry is that Player 2 may…
This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic (LQ) Stackelberg mean field games of backward-forward stochastic systems, involving a backward leader and a substantial number of forward followers. The leader initiates by providing its…
A repeated network game where agents have quadratic utilities that depend on information externalities -- an unknown underlying state -- as well as payoff externalities -- the actions of all other agents in the network -- is considered.…
In this paper, we establish a zero-sum, hybrid state stochastic game model for designing defense policies for cyber-physical systems against different types of attacks. With the increasingly integrated properties of cyber-physical systems…
This paper considers the problem of two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with both players adopting impulse controls in finite horizon under rather weak assumptions on the cost functions ($c$ and $\chi$ not decreasing in time).…
We present a novel algorithm for game-theoretic trajectory planning, tailored for settings in which agents can only observe one another in specific regions of the state space. Such problems arise naturally in the context of multi-robot…
We provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first computational study of extensive-form adversarial team games. These games are sequential, zero-sum games in which a team of players, sharing the same utility function, faces an adversary.…
This paper is about a set-based computing method for solving a general class of two-player zero-sum Stackelberg differential games. We assume that the game is modeled by a set of coupled nonlinear differential equations, which can be…
We introduce the lookahead-bounded Q-learning (LBQL) algorithm, a new, provably convergent variant of Q-learning that seeks to improve the performance of standard Q-learning in stochastic environments through the use of ``lookahead'' upper…
In this paper, we propose a new efficient algorithm to compute the value function for zero-sum stopping games featuring two players with opposing interests. This can be seen as a game version of the ''forward algorithm'' for (one-player)…
We tackle the problem of learning equilibria in simulation-based games. In such games, the players' utility functions cannot be described analytically, as they are given through a black-box simulator that can be queried to obtain noisy…
The peculiarity of adversarial team games resides in the asymmetric information available to the team members during the play, which makes the equilibrium computation problem hard even with zero-sum payoffs. The algorithms available in the…
Many real-world applications involve some agents that fall into two teams, with payoffs that are equal within the same team but of opposite sign across the opponent team. The so-called two-team zero-sum Markov games (2t0sMGs) can be…