Related papers: Regularity of the Value Function in Discounted Inf…
This paper presents a further investigation of the properties of infinite-time mean field forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) and the associated elliptic master equations, which were introduced in [18] as…
In this paper, we study the infinite-time mean field games with discounting, establishing an equilibrium where individual optimal strategies collectively regenerate the mean-field distribution. To solve this problem, we partition all agents…
In this paper, we study a class of degenerate mean field games (MFGs) with state-distribution dependent and unbounded functional diffusion coefficients. With a probabilistic method, we study the well-posedness of the forward-backward…
We prove the global-in-time well-posedness for a broad class of mean field game problems, which is beyond the special linear-quadratic setting, as long as the mean field sensitivity is not too large. Through the stochastic maximum…
The theory of first-order mean field type differential games examines the systems of infinitely many identical agents interacting via some external media under assumption that each agent is controlled by two players. We study the…
Mean field games model equilibria in games with a continuum of players as limiting systems of symmetric $n$-player games with weak interaction between the players. We consider a finite-state, infinite-horizon problem with two cost criteria:…
We consider deterministic Mean Field Games (MFG) in all Euclidean space with a cost functional continuous with respect to the distribution of the agents and attaining its minima in a compact set. We first show that the static MFG with such…
In this paper, we investigate the robustness of stationary mean-field equilibria in the presence of model uncertainties, specifically focusing on infinite-horizon discounted cost functions. To achieve this, we initially establish…
We study the regularity and well-posedness of the local, first-order forward-backward mean field games system, assuming a polynomially growing cost function and a Hamiltonian of quadratic growth. We consider systems and terminal data that…
This paper studies multidimensional mean field games with common noise and the related system of McKean-Vlasov forward-backward stochastic differential equations deriving from the stochastic maximum principle. We first propose some…
We formulate a class of mean field games on a finite state space with variational principles resembling those in continuous-state mean field games. We construct a controlled continuity equation featuring a nonlinear activation function on…
In this paper, we consider a system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) with monotone functionals. We show the existence and uniqueness of such a system by the method of continuation similarly to Peng and Wu…
We study a McKean-Vlasov Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (FBSDE) in connection with the theory of Stochastic Differential Mean-Field games, particularly the weak (non-fully coupled) formulation described in Section 3.3.1…
In this paper we study a mean field model for discrete time, finite number of states, dynamic games. These models arise in situations that involve a very large number of agents moving from state to state according to certain optimality…
We consider an n-player symmetric stochastic game with weak interaction between the players. Time is continuous and the horizon and the number of states are finite. We show that the value function of each of the players can be approximated…
In this paper, we consider mean-field games where the interaction of each player with the mean-field takes into account not only the states of the players but also their collective behavior, To do so, we develop a random variable framework…
In this paper, we introduce discrete-time linear mean-field games subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of a generic agent is a compact Borel space. At every time, each agent is randomly…
In his lectures at College de France, P.L. Lions introduced the concept of Master equation, see [5] for Mean Field Games. It is introduced in a heuristic fashion, from the system of partial differential equations, associated to a Nash…
We establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for a stochastic mean-field game of optimal investment. The analysis covers both finite and infinite time horizons, and the mean-field interaction of the representative company…
We consider a mean-field game model where the cost functions depend on a fixed parameter, called \textit{state}, which is unknown to players. Players learn about the state from a a stream of private signals they receive throughout the game.…