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In this work, we investigate the online learning problem of revenue maximization in ad auctions, where the seller needs to learn the click-through rates (CTRs) of each ad candidate and charge the price of the winner through a pay-per-click…
Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from…
Bilateral trade models the problem of intermediating between two rational agents -- a seller and a buyer -- both characterized by a private valuation for an item they want to trade. We study the online learning version of the problem, in…
In online advertising markets, budget-constrained advertisers acquire ad placements through repeated bidding in auctions on various platforms. We present a strategy for bidding optimally in a set of auctions that may or may not be…
First-price auctions have recently gained significant traction in digital advertising markets, exemplified by Google's transition from second-price to first-price auctions. Unlike in second-price auctions, where bidding one's private…
We study online learning problems in which a decision maker has to take a sequence of decisions subject to $m$ long-term constraints. The goal of the decision maker is to maximize their total reward, while at the same time achieving small…
It is a common practice in the current literature of electricity markets to use game-theoretic approaches for strategic price bidding. However, they generally rely on the assumption that the strategic bidders have prior knowledge of rival…
Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. We study this problem from the perspective of a broker, in a regret…
First-price auctions have largely replaced traditional bidding approaches based on Vickrey auctions in programmatic advertising. As far as learning is concerned, first-price auctions are more challenging because the optimal bidding strategy…
Most microeconomic models of interest involve optimizing a piecewise linear function. These include contract design in hidden-action principal-agent problems, selling an item in posted-price auctions, and bidding in first-price auctions.…
We study the problem of \emph{dynamic regret minimization} in $K$-armed Dueling Bandits under non-stationary or time varying preferences. This is an online learning setup where the agent chooses a pair of items at each round and observes…
We study an online forecasting setting in which, over $T$ rounds, $N$ strategic experts each report a forecast to a mechanism, the mechanism selects one forecast, and then the outcome is revealed. In any given round, each expert has a…
Online learning algorithms are widely used in strategic multi-agent settings, including repeated auctions, contract design, and pricing competitions, where agents adapt their strategies over time. A key question in such environments is how…
Companies like Google and Microsoft run billions of auctions every day to sell advertising opportunities. Any change to the rules of these auctions can have a tremendous effect on the revenue of the company and the welfare of the…
Existing online learning algorithms for adversarial Markov Decision Processes achieve ${O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret after $T$ rounds of interactions even if the loss functions are chosen arbitrarily by an adversary, with the caveat that the…
Consider the classical problem of predicting the next bit in a sequence of bits. A standard performance measure is {\em regret} (loss in payoff) with respect to a set of experts. For example if we measure performance with respect to two…
We consider a number of questions related to tradeoffs between reward and regret in repeated gameplay between two agents. To facilitate this, we introduce a notion of $\textit{generalized equilibrium}$ which allows for asymmetric regret…
In this paper, we study how a budget-constrained bidder should learn to bid adaptively in repeated first-price auctions to maximize cumulative payoff. This problem arises from the recent industry-wide shift from second-price auctions to…
Online advertising has recently grown into a highly competitive and complex multi-billion-dollar industry, with advertisers bidding for ad slots at large scales and high frequencies. This has resulted in a growing need for efficient…
In this paper, we analyze a natural learning algorithm for uniform pacing of advertising budgets, equipped to adapt to varying ad sale platform conditions. On the demand side, advertisers face a fundamental technical challenge in automating…