Related papers: Adversarial Elicitation
We present a novel bilateral negotiation model that allows a self-interested agent to learn how to negotiate over multiple issues in the presence of user preference uncertainty. The model relies upon interpretable strategy templates…
The goal of agents in multi-agent environments is to maximize total reward against the opposing agents that are encountered. Following a game-theoretic solution concept, such as Nash equilibrium, may obtain a strong performance in some…
Prior work has studied the computational complexity of computing optimal strategies to commit to in Stackelberg or leadership games, where a leader commits to a strategy which is observed by one or more followers. We extend this setting to…
A principal delegates decisions to a biased agent. Payoffs depend on a state that the principal cannot observe. Initially, the agent does not observe the state, but he can acquire information about it at a cost. We characterize the…
Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information- and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while…
We analyze the optimal delegation problem between a principal and an agent, assuming that the latter has state-independent preferences. We demonstrate that if the principal is more risk-averse than the agent toward non-status quo options,…
We study information design settings where the designer controls information about a state, and there are multiple agents interacting in a game who are privately informed about their types. Each agent's utility depends on all agents' types…
Incentives are more likely to elicit desired outcomes when they are designed based on accurate models of agents' strategic behavior. A growing literature, however, suggests that people do not quite behave like standard economic agents in a…
We study the algorithmics of information structure design -- a.k.a. persuasion or signaling -- in a fundamental special case introduced by Arieli and Babichenko: multiple agents, binary actions, and no inter-agent externalities. Unlike…
We consider general Bayesian persuasion problems where the receiver's utility is single-peaked in a one-dimensional action. We show that a signal that pools at most two states in each realization is always optimal, and that such pairwise…
We study the principal-agent problem with a third party that we call social planner, whose responsibility is to reconcile the conflicts of interest between the two players and induce socially optimal outcome in terms of some given social…
We provide theoretical bounds on the worst case performance of the greedy algorithm in seeking to maximize a normalized, monotone, but not necessarily submodular objective function under a simple partition matroid constraint. We also…
We consider a two-road dynamic routing game where the state of one of the roads (the "risky road") is stochastic and may change over time. This generates room for experimentation. A central planner may wish to induce some of the (finite…
We study the fundamental problem of designing contracts in principal-agent problems under uncertainty. Previous works mostly addressed Bayesian settings in which principal's uncertainty is modeled as a probability distribution over agent's…
We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…
We study the optimal asset allocation problem for a fund manager whose compensation depends on the performance of her portfolio with respect to a benchmark. The objective of the manager is to maximise the expected utility of her final…
An agent observes the set of available projects and proposes some, but not necessarily all, of them. A principal chooses one or none from the proposed set. We solve for a mechanism that minimizes the principal's worst-case regret. We…
In practice, incentive providers (i.e., principals) often cannot observe the reward realizations of incentivized agents, which is in contrast to many principal-agent models that have been previously studied. This information asymmetry…
We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism-selection games in which the designer can only commit to short-term mechanisms. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the outcomes of…
In cooperative human decision-making, agreements are often not total; a partial degree of agreement is sufficient to commit to a decision and move on, as long as one is somewhat confident that the involved parties are likely to stand by…