Related papers: Multi-type random game dynamics: limits at discont…

Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…

Bounded rationality refers to the non-optimal rationality of players in non-cooperative games. In a networked game, the bounded rationality of players may be heterogeneous and spatially distributed. It has been shown that the `system…

In this paper, we study proximal type dynamics in the context of noncooperative multi-agent network games. These dynamics arise in different applications, since they describe distributed decision making in multi-agent networks, e.g., in…

Game dynamics in which three or more strategies are cyclically competitive, as represented by the rock-scissors-paper game, have attracted practical and theoretical interests. In evolutionary dynamics, cyclic competition results in…

Evolutionary game theory has proven to be an elegant framework providing many fruitful insights in population dynamics and human behaviour. Here, we focus on the aspect of behavioural plasticity and its effect on the evolution of…

In this paper, we study the decision making of multiple autonomous vehicles at a roundabout. The behaviours of the vehicles depend on their aggressiveness, which indicates how much they value speed over safety. We propose a distributed…

Evolutionary game theory is a framework to formalize the evolution of collectives ("populations") of competing agents that are playing a game and, after every round, update their strategies to maximize individual payoffs. There are two…

This paper studies a dynamic discrete-time queuing model where at every period players get a new job and must send all their jobs to a queue that has a limited capacity. Players have an incentive to send their jobs as late as possible;…

Direct reciprocity facilitates the evolution of cooperation when individuals interact repeatedly. Most previous studies on direct reciprocity implicitly assume compulsory interactions. Yet, interactions are often voluntary in human…

The Optional Public Goods Game is a three-strategy game in which an individual can play as a cooperator or defector or decide not to participate. Despite its simplicity, this model can effectively represent many human social dilemmas, such…

Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by…

Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts…

We study a model for cascade effects over finite networks based on a deterministic binary linear threshold model. Our starting point is a networked coordination game where each agent's payoff is the sum of the payoffs coming from pairwise…

We introduce Mean Field Markov games with $N$ players, in which each individual in a large population interacts with other randomly selected players. The states and actions of each player in an interaction together determine the…

Cooperation or defection and participation or withdrawal are well-known options of behavior in game-like activities in free societies, yet the co-evolutionary dynamics of these behavioral traits in the individual level are not well…

Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This…

We derive a class of macroscopic differential equations that describe collective adaptation, starting from a discrete-time stochastic microscopic model. The behavior of each agent is a dynamic balance between adaptation that locally…

Human decision behaviour is quite diverse. In many games humans on average do not achieve maximal payoff and the behaviour of individual players remains inhomogeneous even after playing many rounds. For instance, in repeated prisoner…

We consider three distinct discrete-time models of learning and evolution in games: a biological model based on intra-species selective pressure, the dynamics induced by pairwise proportional imitation, and the exponential / multiplicative…

In this paper, we examine the convergence landscape of multi-agent learning under uncertainty. Specifically, we analyze two stochastic models of regularized learning in continuous games -- one in continuous and one in discrete time with the…