Related papers: Multi-type random game dynamics: limits at discont…
While quite a few recent papers have explored game-resource feedback using the framework of evolutionary game theory, almost all the studies are confined to using time-continuous dynamical equations. Moreover, in such literature, the effect…
We consider the dynamics of player's strategies in repeated market games, where the selection of strategies is determined by a learning model. Prior theoretical analysis and experimental data show that after large number of plays the…
We address the problem of how cooperative (altruistic-like) behavior arises in natural and social systems by analyzing an ultimatum game in complex networks. Specifically, three types of players are considered: (a) empathetic, whose…
A simple periodically driven system displaying rich behavior is introduced and studied. The system self-organizes into a mosaic of static ordered regions with three possible patterns, which are threaded by one-dimensional paths on which a…
In the standard Minority Game, players use historical minority choices as the sole public information to pick one out of the two alternatives. However, publishing historical minority choices is not the only way to present global system…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classic research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then…
Cooperative behaviors are deeply embedded in structured biological and social systems. Networks are often employed to portray pairwise interactions among individuals, where network nodes represent individuals and links indicate who…
We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…
We study the emergency of mutual cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games when the players are located on a square lattice. The players can choose one of the three strategies: cooperation (C), defection (D) or "tit for tat" (T),…
An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of…
This paper introduces a hierarchical framework for population games, where individuals delegate decision-making to proxies that act within their own strategic interests. This framework extends classical population games, where individuals…
The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…
Experiments on the ultimatum game have revealed that humans are remarkably fond of fair play. When asked to share an amount of money, unfair offers are rare and their acceptance rate small. While empathy and spatiality may lead to the…
This paper presents algorithms for non-zero sum nonlinear constrained dynamic games with full information. Such problems emerge when multiple players with action constraints and differing objectives interact with the same dynamic system.…
The modelling of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations requires microscopic processes that determine how strategies spread. The exact details of these processes are often chosen without much further consideration. Different types…
Many real-world problems modeled by stochastic games have huge state and/or action spaces, leading to the well-known curse of dimensionality. The complexity of the analysis of large-scale systems is dramatically reduced by exploiting mean…
Strategic decision-making requires balancing immediate opportunities against long-term objectives: a tension fundamental to competitive environments. We investigate this trade-off in chess by analyzing the dynamics of human and AI gameplay…
We study "logit dynamics" [Blume, Games and Economic Behavior, 1993] for strategic games. This dynamics works as follows: at every stage of the game a player is selected uniformly at random and she plays according to a "noisy" best-response…
Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…
Learning algorithms are essential for the applications of game theory in a networking environment. In dynamic and decentralized settings where the traffic, topology and channel states may vary over time and the communication between agents…