Related papers: Adjusted Winner: from Splitting to Selling
Sequential allocation is a simple and attractive mechanism for the allocation of indivisible goods. Agents take turns, according to a policy, to pick items. Sequential allocation is guaranteed to return an allocation which is efficient but…
When users access shared resources in a selfish manner, the resulting societal cost and perceived users' cost is often higher than what would result from a centrally coordinated optimal allocation. While several contributions in mechanism…
In many repeated auction settings, participants care not only about how frequently they win but also how their winnings are distributed over time. This problem arises in various practical domains where avoiding congested demand is crucial,…
The division of goods in the online realm poses opportunities and challenges. While innovative mechanisms can be developed, uncertainty about the future may hinder effective solutions. This project aims to explore fair distribution models…
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin share, that is defined to be the maximum value that…
We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict deadline. The service consumer requires a procurement strategy…
Inspired by Internet ad auction applications, we study the problem of allocating a single item via an auction when bidders place very different values on the item. We formulate this as the problem of prior-free auction and focus on…
The resource allocation problem of optimal assignment of the clients to the available access points in 60 GHz millimeterWave wireless access networks is investigated. The problem is posed as a multiassignment optimisation problem. The…
We give an auction for downward-closed environments that generalizes the random sampling profit extraction auction for digital goods of Fiat et al. (2002). The mechanism divides the agents in to a market and a sample using a biased coin and…
We study the problem of computing maximin share guarantees, a recently introduced fairness notion. Given a set of $n$ agents and a set of goods, the maximin share of a single agent is the best that she can guarantee to herself, if she would…
Given an initial resource allocation, where some agents may envy others or where a different distribution of resources might lead to higher social welfare, our goal is to improve the allocation without reassigning resources. We consider a…
The host of a game presents two indistinguishable envelopes to an agent. One of the envelopes is randomly selected and allocated to the agent. The agent is informed that the monetary content of one of the envelopes is twice that of the…
We consider the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions and explore the connection between two prominent fairness notions: maximum Nash welfare (MNW) and envy-freeness up to any…
The paper develops a decentralized resource allocation mechanism for allocating divisible goods with capacity constraints to non-price-taking agents with general concave utilities. The proposed mechanism is always budget balanced,…
Fair allocation of indivisible goods studies allocating $m$ goods among $n$ agents in a fair manner. While fairness is a fundamental requirement in many real-world applications, it often conflicts with (economic) efficiency. This raises a…
Fair division of indivisible goods is a very well-studied problem. The goal of this problem is to distribute $m$ goods to $n$ agents in a "fair" manner, where every agent has a valuation for each subset of goods. We assume general…
In practice, most auction mechanisms are not strategy-proof, so equilibrium analysis is required to predict bidding behavior. In many auctions, though, an exact equilibrium is not known and one would like to understand whether -- manually…
We study a fair resource scheduling problem, where a set of interval jobs are to be allocated to heterogeneous machines controlled by agents. Each job is associated with release time, deadline, and processing time such that it can be…
Information exchange is a crucial component of many real-world multi-agent systems. However, the communication between the agents involves two major challenges: the limited bandwidth, and the shared communication medium between the agents,…
Budget-feasible procurement has been a major paradigm in mechanism design since its introduction by Singer (2010). An auctioneer (buyer) with a strict budget constraint is interested in buying goods or services from a group of strategic…