Related papers: Utilitarian Distortion Under Probabilistic Voting
We study how electoral rules shape polarization dynamics when voters and candidates both adapt to repeated election outcomes. We introduce two geometric primitives for comparing rules under this feedback: the \emph{winner radius} $R_t =…
The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. In \cite{McL11}, McLennan showed that a similar impossibility result holds even if we consider…
We examine two aspects of the mathematical basis for two-tier voting systems, such as that of the Council of the European Union. These aspects concern the use of square-root weights and the choice of quota. Square-root weights originate in…
We present a novel model for the effect of echo chambers, filter bubbles, and reinforcement on election results. Our model extends the well known voter model with zealots to include reinforcement. We analyze the behaviour of the model,…
Rankings are central to decision-making in fields ranging from education to online platforms, yet classical deterministic methods such as the Borda count method or Copeland-type pairwise methods ignore uncertainty due to sampling noise or…
This work analyses surprising elections, and attempts to quantify the notion of surprise in elections. A voter is surprised if their estimate of the winner (assumed to be based on a combination of the preferences of their social connections…
The coalgebraic modelling of alternating automata and of probabilistic automata has long been obstructed by the absence of distributive laws of the powerset monad over itself, respectively of the powerset monad over the finite distribution…
Shortlisting of candidates--selecting a group of "best" candidates--is a special case of multiwinner elections. We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the perhaps…
We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We fully characterize the optimal proposal and experiment when Vetoer has quadratic loss,…
During recent years the interest of optimization and machine learning communities in high-probability convergence of stochastic optimization methods has been growing. One of the main reasons for this is that high-probability complexity…
Independent voters play an increasingly decisive role in contemporary elections, yet their collective behavior remains poorly understood. This paper investigates how a minority of voters with greater flexibility in their political…
The Plackett-Luce (PL) model is ubiquitous in learning-to-rank (LTR) because it provides a useful and intuitive probabilistic model for sampling ranked lists. Counterfactual offline evaluation and optimization of ranking metrics are pivotal…
In elections, the vote shares or turnout rates show a strong spatial correlation. The logarithmic decay with distance suggests that a 2D noisy diffusive equation describes the system. Based on the study of U.S. presidential elections data,…
We provide mechanisms and new metric distortion bounds for line-up elections. In such elections, a set of $n$ voters, $m$ candidates, and $\ell$ positions are all located in a metric space. The goal is to choose a set of candidates and…
Condorcet domains are subsets of permutations arising in voting theory: regarding their permutations as preference orders on a list of candidates, one avoids Condorcet's paradox when aggregating the preferences via a simple majority…
We consider a model where a subset of candidates must be selected based on voter preferences, subject to general constraints that specify which subsets are feasible. This model generalizes committee elections with diversity constraints,…
A privacy-utility tradeoff is developed for an arbitrary set of finite-alphabet source distributions. Privacy is quantified using differential privacy (DP), and utility is quantified using expected Hamming distortion maximized over the set…
In this study, we introduced a probabilistic voter, regarding symbol probabilities in decision process besides majority consensus. Conventional majority voter is independent of functionality of redundant modules. In our study, proposed…
Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Faliszewski et al. [FHHR07] proved that Llull voting (which is here denoted by Copeland^1) and a variant (here denoted by Copeland^0)…
Political moderation, a key attractor in democratic systems, proves highly fragile under realistic information conditions. We develop a stochastic model of opinion dynamics to analyze how noise and differential susceptibility reshape the…