Related papers: Core-Stable Kidney Exchange via Altruistic Donors
Motivated by the real-world problem of international kidney exchange (IKEP), recent literature introduced a generalized transferable utility matching game featuring a partition of the vertex set of a graph into players, and analyzed its…
Balancing fairness and efficiency in resource allocation is a classical economic and computational problem. The price of fairness measures the worst-case loss of economic efficiency when using an inefficient but fair allocation rule; for…
To overcome incompatibility issues, kidney patients may swap their donors. In international kidney exchange programmes (IKEPs), countries merge their national patient-donor pools. We consider a recently introduced credit system. In each…
Background: The kidney exchange problem (KEP) addresses the matching of patients in need for a replacement organ with compatible living donors. Ideally many medical institutions should participate in a matching program to increase the…
In the query-commit problem we are given a graph where edges have distinct probabilities of existing. It is possible to query the edges of the graph, and if the queried edge exists then its endpoints are irrevocably matched. The goal is to…
We design a flexible algorithm that exploits deceased donor kidneys to initiate chains of living donor kidney paired donations, combining deceased and living donor allocation mechanisms to improve the quantity and quality of kidney…
Kidney Exchange Programmes (KEPs) facilitate the exchange of kidneys, and larger pools of recipient-donor pairs tend to yield proportionally more transplants, leading to the proposal of international KEPs (IKEPs). However, as studied by…
The kidney exchange problem (KEP) is to find a constellation of exchanges that maximizes the number of transplants that can be carried out for a set of pairs of patients with kidney disease and their incompatible donors. Recently, this…
In this paper we consider the pairwise kidney exchange game. This game naturally appears in situations that some service providers benefit from pairwise allocations on a network, such as the kidney exchanges between hospitals. Ashlagi et…
Consider a matching problem on a graph where disjoint sets of vertices are privately owned by self-interested agents. An edge between a pair of vertices indicates compatibility and allows the vertices to match. We seek a mechanism to…
This paper considers two-sided matching with budget constraints where one side (firm or hospital) can make monetary transfers (offer wages) to the other (worker or doctor). In a standard model, while multiple doctors can be matched to a…
Incompatibility between patient and donor is a major barrier in kidney transplantation (KT). The increasing shortage of kidney donors has driven the development of desensitization techniques to overcome this immunological challenge.…
AI algorithms increasingly make decisions that impact entire groups of humans. Since humans tend to hold varying and even conflicting preferences, AI algorithms responsible for making decisions on behalf of such groups encounter the problem…
We study dynamic matching in exchange markets with easy- and hard-to-match agents. A greedy policy, which attempts to match agents upon arrival, ignores the positive externality that waiting agents generate by facilitating future matchings.…
Heart transplantation is a viable path for patients suffering from advanced heart failure, but this lifesaving option is severely limited due to donor shortage. Although the current allocation policy was recently revised in 2018, a major…
The burgeoning need for kidney transplantation mandates immediate attention. Mismatch of deceased donor-recipient kidney leads to post-transplant death. To ensure ideal kidney donor-recipient match and minimize post-transplant deaths, the…
Kidney transplantation is the preferred treatment for end-stage renal disease, yet the scarcity of donors and inefficiencies in allocation systems create major bottlenecks, resulting in prolonged wait times and alarming mortality rates.…
Kidney Exchange Programs (KEPs) promote access to living donor trans- plantation for patients suffering from end stage renal disease. The HLA compatibility between transplant recipients and donors plays an important role when solving the…
We consider the matching with contracts framework of Hatfield and Milgrom when one side (a firm or hospital) can make monetary transfers (offer wages) to the other (a worker or doctor). In a standard model, monetary transfers are not…
Kidney exchange programs have been developed to find compatible kidneys for recipients who have incompatible donors. On the other hand, patients who do not have a living donor depend upon deceased donor (DD) donations to get a kidney…