Related papers: Allocation Proportionality of OWA--Based Committee…
Approval voting is a common method of preference aggregation where voters vote by ``approving'' of a subset of candidates and the winner(s) are those who are approved of by the largest number of voters. In approval voting, the degree to…
One proposes a first alternative rule of combination to WAO (Weighted Average Operator) proposed recently by Josang, Daniel and Vannoorenberghe, called Proportional Conflict Redistribution rule (denoted PCR1). PCR1 and WAO are particular…
We study voting rules for participatory budgeting, where a group of voters collectively decides which projects should be funded using a common budget. We allow the projects to have arbitrary costs, and the voters to have arbitrary additive…
A Ranked candidate voting method based on Phragmen's procedure is described that can be used to produce a top-down proportional candidate list. The method complies with the Droop proportionality criterion satisfied by Single Transferable…
We study a budget aggregation setting where voters express their preferred allocation of a fixed budget over a set of alternatives, and a mechanism aggregates these preferences into a single output allocation. Motivated by scenarios in…
Motivated by civic problems such as participatory budgeting and multiwinner elections, we consider the problem of public good allocation: Given a set of indivisible projects (or candidates) of different sizes, and voters with different…
In the committee voting setting, a subset of $k$ alternatives is selected based on the preferences of voters. In this paper, our goal is to efficiently compute $\textit{ex-ante}$ fair probability distributions over committees. We introduce…
Apportionment assigns indivisible items among groups. By the Balinski-Young theorem, no method can satisfy both house monotonicity and the quota rule. This paper investigates quota violations caused by nonzero allocation constraints, and…
In participatory budgeting we are given a set of projects---each with a cost, an available budget, and a set of voters who in some form express their preferences over the projects. The goal is to select---based on voter preferences---a…
We study proportional representation in the temporal voting model, where collective decisions are made repeatedly over time over a fixed horizon. Prior work has extensively investigated how proportional representation axioms from…
Referring to a standard context of voting theory, and to the classic notion of voting situation, here we show that it is possible to observe any arbitrary set of elections' outcomes, no matter how paradoxical it may appear. On this purpose…
A population of voters must elect representatives among themselves to decide on a sequence of possibly unforeseen binary issues. Voters care only about the final decision, not the elected representatives. The disutility of a voter is…
We extend the fair machine learning literature by considering the problem of proportional centroid clustering in a metric context. For clustering $n$ points with $k$ centers, we define fairness as proportionality to mean that any $n/k$…
Voting algorithms have been widely used as consensus protocols in the realization of fault-tolerant systems. These algorithms are best suited for distributed systems of nodes with low computational power or heterogeneous networks, where…
We study the probability that a given candidate is an alpha-winner, i.e. a candidate preferred to each other candidate j by a fraction alpha_j of the voters. This extends the classical notion of Condorcet winner, which corresponds to the…
We study a participatory budgeting problem of aggregating the preferences of agents and dividing a budget over the projects. A budget division solution is a probability distribution over the projects. The main purpose of our study concerns…
Conformal prediction offers a distribution-free framework for constructing prediction sets with finite-sample coverage. Yet, efficiently leveraging multiple conformity scores to reduce prediction set size remains a major open challenge.…
The Constitutionally mandated task of assigning Congressional seats to the various U.S. States proportional to their represented populations ("according to their numbers") has engendered much contention, but rather less consensus. Using the…
Assuming that partisan fairness and responsiveness are important aspects of redistricting, it is important to measure them. Many measures of partisan bias are satisfactory for states that are balanced with roughly equal proportions of…
Each voter $i \in I$ has $\alpha_i$ cards that (s)he distributes among the candidates $a \in A$ as a measure of approval. One (or several) candidate(s) who received the maximum number of cards is (are) elected. We provide polynomial…