Related papers: Selfish routing games with priority lanes
We present a new class of vertex cover and set cover games. The price of anarchy bounds match the best known constant factor approximation guarantees for the centralized optimization problems for linear and also for submodular costs -- in…
During a pandemic people have to find a trade-off between meeting others and staying safely at home. While meeting others is pleasant, it also increases the risk of infection. We consider this dilemma by introducing a game-theoretic network…
Like many routing protocols, the Tor anonymity network has decentralized path selection, in clients locally and independently choose paths. As a result, network resources may be left idle, leaving the system in a suboptimal state. This is…
We model the formation of networks as the result of a game where by players act selfishly to get the portfolio of links they desire most. The integration of player strategies into the network formation model is appropriate for…
When many independent users try to route traffic through a network, the flow can easily become suboptimal as a consequence of congestion of the most efficient paths. The degree of this suboptimality is quantified by the so-called "price of…
We consider the classical machine scheduling, where $n$ jobs need to be scheduled on $m$ machines, and where job $j$ scheduled on machine $i$ contributes $p_{i,j}\in \mathbb{R}$ to the load of machine $i$, with the goal of minimizing the…
Suppose customers need to choose when to arrive to a congested queue with some desired service at the end, provided by a single server that operates only during a certain time interval. We study a model where the customers incur not only…
We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…
Autonomous vehicles will be an integral part of ride-sharing services in the future. This setting differs from traditional ride-sharing marketplaces because of the absence of the supply side (drivers). However, it has far-reaching…
This paper gives a complete analysis of worst-case equilibria for various versions of weighted congestion games with two players and affine cost functions. The results are exact price of anarchy bounds which are parametric in the weights of…
We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supply-chains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of some player is…
We study the strategic purchasing of priorities in a time-dependent accumulating priority M/G/$1$ queue. We formulate a non-cooperative game in which customers purchase priority coefficients with the goal of reducing waiting costs in…
In a scheduling game, each player owns a job and chooses a machine to execute it. While the social cost is the maximal load over all machines (makespan), the cost (disutility) of each player is the completion time of its own job. In the…
We introduce a framework for studying the effect of cooperation on the quality of outcomes in utility games. Our framework is a coalitional analog of the smoothness framework of non-cooperative games. Coalitional smoothness implies bounds…
The effective design and management of public transport systems are essential to ensure the best service for users. The performance of a transport system will depend heavily on user behaviour. In the common-lines problem approach, users…
In cost sharing games, the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria fundamentally depends on the method that is used to share the resources' costs. We consider a general class of resource allocation problems in which a set of…
Price of anarchy quantifies the degradation of social welfare in games due to the lack of a centralized authority that can enforce the optimal outcome. At its antipodes, mechanism design studies how to ameliorate these effects by…
Many real-world networks, like the Internet, are not the result of central design but instead the outcome of the interaction of local agents who are selfishly optimizing for their individual utility. The famous Network Creation Game…
We present new coordination mechanisms for scheduling selfish jobs on $m$ unrelated machines. A coordination mechanism aims to mitigate the impact of selfishness of jobs on the efficiency of schedules by defining a local scheduling policy…
The rapid development and deployment of vehicle technologies offer opportunities to re-think the way traffic is managed. This paper capitalizes on vehicle connectivity and proposes an economic instrument and corresponding cooperative…