Related papers: Dynamic Matching Under Patience Imbalance

We study dynamic matching in exchange markets with easy- and hard-to-match agents. A greedy policy, which attempts to match agents upon arrival, ignores the positive externality that waiting agents generate by facilitating future matchings.…

The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…

While significant advancements have been made in the field of fair machine learning, the majority of studies focus on scenarios where the decision model operates on a static population. In this paper, we study fairness in dynamic systems…

Motivated by applications from gig economy and online marketplaces, we study a two-sided queueing system under joint pricing and matching controls. The queueing system is modeled by a bipartite graph, where the vertices represent customer…

We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…

Tandem queueing systems are widely-used stochastic models that arise from many real-life service operations systems. Motivated by the desire to understand the trade-off between the performance and complexity of policies for…

Inspired by quantum switches, we consider a discrete-time multi-way matching system with two classes of arrivals: requests for entangled pair of qubits between two nodes, and qubits from each node that can be used to serve the requests. An…

We study the problem of decision-making in the setting of a scarcity of shared resources when the preferences of agents are unknown a priori and must be learned from data. Taking the two-sided matching market as a running example, we focus…

We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…

We study the design of decision-making mechanism for resource allocations over a multi-agent system in a dynamic environment. Agents' privately observed preference over resources evolves over time and the population is dynamic due to the…

We study the design of optimal allocation mechanisms in an environment where agents and goods arrive stochastically. Agents have private types that determine the principal payoff. Either agents or goods can be held in a queue at a flow cost…

We study adaptive two-sided assortment optimization for revenue maximization in choice-based matching platforms. The platform has two sides of agents, an initiating side, and a responding side. The decision-maker sequentially selects agents…

We consider a load balancing system consisting of $n$ single-server queues working in parallel, with heterogeneous service rates. Jobs arrive to a central dispatcher, which has to dispatch them to one of the queues immediately upon arrival.…

We study social welfare in one-sided matching markets where the goal is to efficiently allocate n items to n agents that each have a complete, private preference list and a unit demand over the items. Our focus is on allocation mechanisms…

Caseworkers in foster care systems match waiting children to adoptive homes. We use dynamic matching market design to characterize a class of mechanisms that incentivize expedient matches that homes can accept or decline. We design…

This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group…

This paper studies a decentralized many-to-one matching market where preferences remain uncertain during the matching process. Institutions initiate matching by sending offers, and applicants decide whether to accept upon receiving them.…

We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an…

Decentralized policy optimization has been commonly used in cooperative multi-agent tasks. However, since all agents are updating their policies simultaneously, from the perspective of individual agents, the environment is non-stationary,…

We consider a controlled double-ended queue consisting of two classes of customers, labeled sellers and buyers. The sellers and buyers arrive in a trading market according to two independent renewal processes. Whenever there is a seller and…