Related papers: Greedy Routing Reachability Games
We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…
Most networks are not static objects, but instead they change over time. This observation has sparked rigorous research on temporal graphs within the last years. In temporal graphs, we have a fixed set of nodes and the connections between…
We consider the online minimum cost matching problem on the line, in which there are $n$ servers and, at each of $n$ time steps, a request arrives and must be irrevocably matched to a server that has not yet been matched to, with the goal…
Motivated by an emerging framework of Autonomous Modular Vehicles, we consider the abstract problem of optimally routing two modules, i.e., vehicles that can attach to or detach from each other in motion on a graph. The modules' objective…
Studying the impact of cooperation in strategic settings is one of the cornerstones of algorithmic game theory. Intuitively, allowing more cooperation yields equilibria that are more beneficial for the society of agents. However, for many…
Understanding real-world networks has been a core research endeavor throughout the last two decades. Network Creation Games are a promising approach for this from a game-theoretic perspective. In these games, selfish agents corresponding to…
We consider a scenario in which leaders are required to recruit teams of followers. Each leader cannot recruit all followers, but interaction is constrained according to a bipartite network. The objective for each leader is to reach a state…
A group of mobile agents is given a task to explore an edge-weighted graph $G$, i.e., every vertex of $G$ has to be visited by at least one agent. There is no centralized unit to coordinate their actions, but they can freely communicate…
We consider team zero-sum network congestion games with $n$ agents playing against $k$ interceptors over a graph $G$. The agents aim to minimize their collective cost of sending traffic over paths in $G$, which is an aggregation of edge…
We study the game-theoretic task of selecting mobile agents to deliver multiple items on a network. An instance is given by $m$ messages (physical objects) which have to be transported between specified source-target pairs in a weighted…
Organizations consist of individuals connected by their responsibilities, incentives, and reporting structure. These connections are aptly represented by a network, hierarchical or other, which is often used to divide tasks. A primary goal…
Several mobile agents, modelled as deterministic automata, navigate in an infinite line in synchronous rounds. All agents start in the same round. In each round, an agent can move to one of the two neighboring nodes, or stay idle. Agents…
Geographic routing is a routing paradigm, which uses geographic coordinates of network nodes to determine routes. Greedy routing, the simplest form of geographic routing forwards a packet to the closest neighbor towards the destination. A…
We consider a class of distributed submodular maximization problems in which each agent must choose a single strategy from its strategy set. The global objective is to maximize a submodular function of the strategies chosen by each agent.…
We study selfish routing games where users can choose between regular and priority service for each network edge on their chosen path. Priority users pay an additional fee, but in turn they may travel the edge prior to non-priority users,…
Major cryptocurrency networks have relied on random peering choice rules for making connections in their peer-to-peer networks. Generally, these choices have good properties, particularly for open, permissionless networks. Random peering…
Game theory has emerged as a fruitful paradigm for the design of networked multiagent systems. A fundamental component of this approach is the design of agents' utility functions so that their self-interested maximization results in a…
Within mobility systems, the presence of self-interested users can lead to aggregate routing patterns that are far from the societal optimum which could be achieved by centrally controlling the users' choices. In this paper, we design a…
Many policy problems involve designing individualized treatment allocation rules to maximize the equilibrium social welfare of interacting agents. Focusing on large-scale simultaneous decision games with strategic complementarities, we…
We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…