Related papers: Dynamic Mechanism Design without Monetary Transfer…

Most existing routing strategies to improve transport efficiency have little attention what order should the packets be delivered, just simply used first-in-first-out queue discipline. However, it is far from optimal. In this paper we apply…

We study the welfare of a mechanism in a dynamic environment where a learning investor can make a costly investment to change her value. In many real-world problems, the common assumption that the investor always makes the best responses,…

This paper explores the economic interactions within modern crowdsourcing markets. In these markets, employers issue requests for tasks, platforms facilitate the recruitment of crowd workers, and workers complete tasks for monetary rewards.…

We study a game-theoretic variant of the maximum circulation problem. In a flow allocation game, we are given a directed flow network. Each node is a rational agent and can strategically allocate any incoming flow to the outgoing edges.…

We study the game-theoretic task of selecting mobile agents to deliver multiple items on a network. An instance is given by $m$ messages (physical objects) which have to be transported between specified source-target pairs in a weighted…

We study the assignment problem of objects to agents with heterogeneous preferences under distributional constraints. Each agent is associated with a publicly known type and has a private ordinal ranking over objects. We are interested in…

Optimizing network throughput in real-world dynamic systems is critical, especially for diverse and delay-sensitive multimedia data types such as VoIP and video streaming. Traditional routing protocols, which rely on static metrics and…

We consider the optimal allocation of generic resources among multiple generic entities of interest over a finite planning horizon, where each entity generates stochastic returns as a function of its resource allocation during each period.…

Allocation of scarce healthcare resources under limited logistic and infrastructural facilities is a major issue in the modern society. We consider the problem of allocation of healthcare resources like vaccines to people or hospital beds…

We consider house allocation with existing tenants in which each agent has dichotomous preferences. We present strategyproof, polynomial-time, and (strongly) individually rational algorithms that satisfy the maximum number of agents. For…

We study balanced exchange problems in which agents with responsive preferences are endowed with multiple indivisible objects and can trade without transfers (e.g. shift exchange, time-banking). Eliciting full preferences over bundles is…

We study hidden-action principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme (called contract) so as to incentivize the agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. In…

In this work we investigate the inefficiency of the electricity system with strategic agents. Specifically, we prove that without a proper control the total demand of an inefficient system is at most twice the total demand of the optimal…

We study how to allocate resources to participants who can strategically misrepresent their deservingness at a cost. A principal assigns item(s) (or money) among multiple agents on the basis of their costly signals. Each agent's signal…

We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…

A model among many may only be best under certain states of the world. Switching from a model to another can also be costly. Finding a procedure to dynamically choose a model in these circumstances requires to solve a complex estimation…

Social dilemmas present a significant challenge in multi-agent cooperation because individuals are incentivised to behave in ways that undermine socially optimal outcomes. Consequently, self-interested agents often avoid collective…

We consider a model where an agent has a repeated decision to make and wishes to maximize their total payoff. Payoffs are influenced by an action taken by the agent, but also an unknown state of the world that evolves over time. Before…

In this paper we study a principal-agent problem in continuous time with multiple lump-sum payments (contracts) paid at different deterministic times. We reduce the non-zero sum Stackelberg game between the principal and agent to a standard…

Recent research has shown that optimal picker tours in rectangular warehouses exhibit deterministic travel patterns within each aisle, and that certain previously considered traversals are unnecessary. Using these insights, this paper…