Related papers: Dynamic Mechanism Design without Monetary Transfer…
This paper studies continuous-time optimal contracting in a hierarchy problem which generalises the model of Sung (2015). The hierarchy is modeled by a series of interlinked principal-agent problems, leading to a sequence of Stackelberg…
Mechanism design is a central research branch in microeconomics. An effective mechanism can significantly improve performance and efficiency of social decisions under desired objectives, such as to maximize social welfare or to maximize…
We have studied numerically the statistical mechanics of the dynamic phenomena, including money circulation and economic mobility, in some transfer models. The models on which our investigations were performed are the basic model proposed…
We build a state-of-the-art dynamic model of private asset allocation that considers five key features of private asset markets: (1) the illiquid nature of private assets, (2) timing lags between capital commitments, capital calls, and…
This study introduces an optimal mechanism in a dynamic stochastic knapsack environment. The model features a single seller who has a fixed quantity of a perfectly divisible item. Impatient buyers with a piece-wise linear utility function…
We develop a model of the behaviour of a dynamically optimizing economic agent who makes consumption-saving and spatial relocation decisions. We formulate an existence result for the model, derive the necessary conditions for optimality and…
Exchange markets are a significant type of market economy, in which each agent holds a budget and certain (divisible) resources available for trading. Most research on equilibrium in exchange economies is based on an environment of…
We consider a matching system with random arrivals of items of different types. The items wait in queues -- one per each item type -- until they are "matched." Each matching requires certain quantities of items of different types; after a…
The problem of optimal allocation of monitoring resources for tracking transactions progressing through a distributed system, modeled as a queueing network, is considered. Two forms of monitoring information are considered, viz., locally…
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…
We consider two-stage tandem queueing systems with one dedicated server in each station and a flexible server that can serve both stations. We assume exponential service times, linear holding costs accrued by jobs present in the system, and…
This paper presents karma mechanisms, a novel approach to the repeated allocation of a scarce resource among competing agents over an infinite time. Examples include deciding which ride hailing trip requests to serve during peak demand,…
Fairness is well studied in the context of resource allocation. Researchers have proposed various fairness notions like envy-freeness (EF), and its relaxations, proportionality and max-min share (MMS). There is vast literature on the…
Dynamic resource allocation to parallel queues is a cornerstone of network scheduling, yet classical solutions often fail when accounting for the overhead of switching delays to queues with superior link conditions. In particular, system…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
We consider a stochastic, dynamic job scheduling problem, formulated as a queueing control problem, in which a single server processes jobs of different types that arrive according to independent Poisson processes. The problem is defined on…
We study non-monetary mechanisms for the fair and efficient allocation of reusable public resources, i.e., resources used for varying durations. We consider settings where a limited resource is repeatedly shared among a set of agents, each…
This paper studies the dynamic programming principle using the measurable selection method for stochastic control of continuous processes. The novelty of this work is to incorporate intermediate expectation constraints on the canonical…
This paper proposes networked dynamics to solve resource allocation problems over time-varying multi-agent networks. The state of each agent represents the amount of used resources (or produced utilities) while the total amount of resources…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of $m$ goods among $n$ agents in the asymptotic setting, where each item's value for each agent is drawn from an underlying joint distribution. Prior works have shown that if this distribution…