Related papers: Topological traps in evolutionary games
The evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas in structured populations has been studied extensively in recent years. Whereas many theoretical studies have found that a heterogeneous network of contacts favors cooperation, the impact of…
Simulating bipartite games, such as the trust game, is not straightforward due to the lack of a natural way to distinguish roles in a single population. The square lattice topology can provide a simple yet elegant solution by alternating…
We introduce nonlinear attractive effects into a spatial Prisoner's Dilemma game where the players located on a square lattice can either cooperate with their nearest neighbors or defect. In every generation, each player updates its…
We study the emergency of mutual cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games when the players are located on a square lattice. The players can choose one of the three strategies: cooperation (C), defection (D) or "tit for tat" (T),…
This paper explores the Coevolutionary Optional Prisoner's Dilemma (COPD) game, which is a simple model to coevolve game strategy and link weights of agents playing the Optional Prisoner's Dilemma game. We consider a population of agents…
We study a spatial two-strategy (cooperation and defection) Prisoner's Dilemma game with two types ($A$ and $B$) of players located on the sites of a square lattice. The evolution of strategy distribution is governed by iterated strategy…
Despite the wealth of empirical and theoretical studies, the origin and maintenance of cooperation is still an evolutionary riddle. In this context, ecological life-history traits which affect the efficiency of selection may play a role,…
Cooperation is central to the success of human societies as it is crucial for overcoming some of the most pressing social challenges of our time. Yet how human cooperation is achieved and may persist is still a main puzzle in the social and…
We study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game on scale-free networks for different initial distributions. We consider three types of initial distributions for cooperators and defectors: initially random distribution with different…
Game theory is fundamental to understanding cooperation between agents. Mainly, the Prisoner's Dilemma is a well-known model that has been extensively studied in complex networks. However, although the emergence of cooperation has been…
Wealthy individuals may be less tempted to defect than those with comparatively low payoffs. To take this into consideration, we introduce coevolutionary success-driven multigames in structured populations. While the core game is always the…
Understanding how cooperation can evolve in populations despite its cost to individual cooperators is an important challenge. Models of spatially structured populations with one individual per node of a graph have shown that cooperation,…
The Prisoner's Dilemma, a 2-person game in which the players can either cooperate or defect, is a common paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation, when individuals exhibit variable degrees of cooperation. It is known that in the…
We consider a finite structured population of mobile individuals that strategically explore a network using a Markov movement model and interact with each other via a public goods game. We extend the model of Erovenko et al. (2019) from…
Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with…
Stability of evolutionary dynamics of non-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates [1], via benefit and cost dilemma is studied . Moreover, the stability condition (b+c/b-c)2 < r1r3 is derived in case of…
Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games are studied with players located on square lattice and random regular graphs defining four neighbors for each one. The players follow one of the three strategies: tit-for-tat, unconditional cooperation,…
Stabilizing cooperation among self-interested individuals presents a fundamental challenge in evolutionary theory and social science. While classical models predict the dominance of defection in social dilemmas, empirical and theoretical…
Evolutionary models are used to study the self-organisation of collective action, often incorporating population structure due to its ubiquitous presence and long-known impact on emerging phenomena. We investigate the evolution of…
We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma, and each player observes a few of the partner's past actions against previous opponents. We depart from the existing related literature by allowing a…