Related papers: Multi-Agent Non-Discriminatory Contracts
We investigate whether fairness is compatible with efficiency in economies with multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their multiple objectives into a single complete and transitive ranking. We adapt envy-freeness,…
We study how to optimally design selection mechanisms, accounting for agents' investment incentives. A principal wishes to allocate a resource of homogeneous quality to a heterogeneous population of agents. The principal commits to a…
We propose to study electricity capacity remuneration mechanism design through a Principal-Agent approach. The Principal represents the aggregation of electricity consumers (or a representative entity), subject to the physical risk of…
We study a continuous time contracting model in which a principal hires a risk averse agent to manage a project over a finite horizon and provides sequential payments whose timing is endogenously determined. The resulting nonzero-sum…
A large fraction of total healthcare expenditure occurs due to end-of-life (EOL) care, which means it is important to study the problem of more carefully incentivizing necessary versus unnecessary EOL care because this has the potential to…
In this paper, we consider dynamic multi-agent systems (MAS) for decentralized resource allocation. The MAS operates at a competitive equilibrium to ensure supply and demand are balanced. First, we investigate the MAS over a finite horizon.…
In a situation of moral hazard, this paper investigates the problem of Principal with $n$ Agents when the number of Agents $n$ goes to infinity. There is competition between the Agents expressed by the fact that they optimize their utility…
We consider a multi-agent delegation mechanism without money. In our model, given a set of agents, each agent has a fixed number of solutions which is exogenous to the mechanism, and privately sends a signal, e.g., a subset of solutions, to…
We analyze a two-period principal-agent model in which the principal faces a budget constraint, and the agent's private costs of performing tasks across the two periods may be correlated. We examine the optimal design of the reward scheme…
In fair division problems, the notion of price of fairness measures the loss in welfare due to a fairness constraint. Prior work on the price of fairness has focused primarily on envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) as the fairness…
We study a natural application of contract design in the context of sequential exploration problems. In our principal-agent setting, a search task is delegated to an agent. The agent performs a sequential exploration of $n$ boxes, suffers…
Interactions between bids to show ads online can lead to an advertiser's ad being shown to more men than women even when the advertiser does not target towards men. We design bidding strategies that advertisers can use to avoid such…
Decision-makers in high-stakes selection processes often face a fundamental choice: whether to make decisions themselves or to delegate authority to another entity whose incentives may only be partially aligned with their own. Such…
In recent years, a significant research effort has been devoted to the design of distributed protocols for the control of multi-agent systems, as the scale and limited communication bandwidth characteristic of such systems render…
We study how to allocate resources to participants who can strategically misrepresent their deservingness at a cost. A principal assigns item(s) (or money) among multiple agents on the basis of their costly signals. Each agent's signal…
Many real-life contractual relations differ completely from the clean, static model at the heart of principal-agent theory. Typically, they involve repeated strategic interactions of the principal and agent, taking place under uncertainty…
The price of anarchy and price of stability are three well-studied performance metrics that seek to characterize the inefficiency of equilibria in distributed systems. The distinction between these two performance metrics centers on the…
A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous software agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In this…
We study a robust contract design problem with deferred inspection, in which a principal allocates a scarce resource to an agent, observes the agent's realized outcome ex post at negligible cost, and conditions transfers on this information…
In this paper, we consider the problem of a Principal aiming at designing a reward function for a population of heterogeneous agents. We construct an incentive based on the ranking of the agents, so that a competition among the latter is…