Related papers: Stabilizing Welfare-Maximizing Decisions via Endog…
We study the optimal joint intervention of a planner who can influence both the standalone marginal utilities of agents in a network and the weights of the links connecting them. The welfare-maximizing intervention displays two key…
What is the emergent long-run equilibrium of a society where many interacting agents bet on the optimal energy to put in place in order to climb on the Bandwagon? In this paper we study the collective behavior of a large population of…
Federated learning offers a decentralized approach to machine learning, where multiple agents collaboratively train a model while preserving data privacy. In this paper, we investigate the decision-making and equilibrium behavior in…
This paper presents karma mechanisms, a novel approach to the repeated allocation of a scarce resource among competing agents over an infinite time. Examples include deciding which ride hailing trip requests to serve during peak demand,…
Coalition formation is concerned with the question of how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. Deviating from most of the previous work, we consider an online variant of the problem, where…
We consider network aggregative games to model and study multi-agent populations in which each rational agent is influenced by the aggregate behavior of its neighbors, as specified by an underlying network. Specifically, we examine systems…
We are concerned with finding Nash Equilibria in agent-based multi-cluster games, where agents are separated into distinct clusters. While the agents inside each cluster collaborate to achieve a common goal, the clusters are considered to…
A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging…
We consider multi-agent decision making, where each agent optimizes its cost function subject to constraints. Agents' actions belong to a compact convex Euclidean space and the agents' cost functions are coupled. We propose a distributed…
We study organizational elections in which each group nominates one candidate and receives as payoff its members expected utility under a probabilistic winning rule. We empirically justify a standard monotonicity assumption by simulating…
Envy, the inclination to compare rewards, can be expected to unfold when inequalities in terms of payoff differences are generated in competitive societies. It is shown that increasing levels of envy lead inevitably to a self-induced…
In this paper, we consider the competitive diffusion game, and study the existence of its pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when defined over general undirected networks. We first determine the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for two…
I propose a flexible structural model to estimate peer effects across various quantiles of the peer outcome distribution. The model allows peers with low, intermediate, and high outcomes to exert distinct influences, thereby capturing more…
Communication or influence networks are probably the most controllable of all factors that are known to impact on the problem-solving capability of task-forces. In the case connections are costly, it is necessary to implement a policy to…
Many important problems in multiagent systems involve resource allocations. Self-interested agents may lie about their valuations if doing so increases their own utilities. Therefore, it is necessary to design mechanisms (collective…
To achieve an optimal outcome in many situations, agents need to choose distinct actions from one another. This is the case notably in many resource allocation problems, where a single resource can only be used by one agent at a time. How…
We consider the decentralized power allocation and spectrum sharing problem in multi-user, multi-channel systems with strategic users. We present a mechanism/game form that has the following desirable features. (1) It is individually…
We study optimal contract design for large populations of heterogeneous agents whose actions generate network spillovers represented by an interaction function. In a linear-quadratic framework, we solve the finite-agent problem and its…
In this work, we consider a population composed of a continuum of agents that seek to maximize a payoff function by moving on a network. The nodes in the network may represent physical locations or abstract choices. The population is…
Nash`s classical bargaining solution suggests that n players in a non-cooperative bargaining situation should find a solution that maximizes the product of each player's utility functions. We consider a special case: Suppose that the…