Related papers: Distributed Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Lo…
The facility location with strategic agents is a canonical problem in the literature on mechanism design without money. Recently, Agrawal et. al. considered this problem in the context of machine learning augmented algorithms, where the…
We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and clients act strategically and heavily influence each other. This contrasts established game-theoretic facility location models with non-strategic clients that…
Autonomous shape and structure formation is an important problem in the domain of large-scale multi-agent systems. In this paper, we propose a 3D structure representation method and a distributed structure formation strategy where settled…
The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decades, largely due to its practical importance in…
This paper investigates a distributed goal assignment problem in leader-following formation control of second-order multi-agent systems. It is assumed that each agent can communicate with nearby agents within the communication range and the…
We study a variation of facility location problems (FLPs) that aims to improve the accessibility of agents to the facility within the context of mechanism design without money. In such a variation, agents have preferences on the ideal…
We consider a scenario consisting of a set of heterogeneous mobile agents located at a depot, and a set of tasks dispersed over a geographic area. The agents are partitioned into different types. The tasks are partitioned into specialized…
Algorithms with predictions have attracted much attention in the last years across various domains, including variants of facility location, as a way to surpass traditional worst-case analyses. We study the $k$-facility location mechanism…
We consider a two-stage robust facility location problem on a metric under an uncertain demand. The decision-maker needs to decide on the (integral) units of supply for each facility in the first stage to satisfy an uncertain second-stage…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
Facility location decisions significantly impact customer behavior and consequently the resulting demand in a wide range of businesses. Furthermore, sequentially realized uncertain demand enforces strategically determining locations under…
This paper deals with solving distributed optimization problems with equality constraints by a class of uncertain nonlinear heterogeneous dynamic multi-agent systems. It is assumed that each agent with an uncertain dynamic model has limited…
We consider a distributed voting problem with a set of agents that are partitioned into disjoint groups and a set of obnoxious alternatives. Agents and alternatives are represented by points in a metric space. The goal is to compute the…
We address the problem of strategyproof (SP) facility location mechanisms on discrete trees. Our main result is a full characterization of onto and SP mechanisms. In particular, we prove that when a single agent significantly affects the…
The differentially private (DP) facility location problem seeks to determine a socially optimal placement for a public facility while ensuring that each participating agent's location remains private. To privatize its input data, a DP…
In this paper, we investigate the Mechanism Design aspects of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem ($m$-CFLP) on a line. We focus on two frameworks. In the first framework, the number of facilities is arbitrary, all facilities have…
We study mechanisms for candidate selection that seek to minimize the social cost, where voters and candidates are associated with points in some underlying metric space. The social cost of a candidate is the sum of its distances to each…
We characterize the class of group-strategyproof mechanisms for the single facility location game in any unconstrained strictly convex space. A mechanism is \emph{group-strategyproof}, if no group of agents can misreport so that all its…
We consider a scenario in which leaders are required to recruit teams of followers. Each leader cannot recruit all followers, but interaction is constrained according to a bipartite network. The objective for each leader is to reach a state…
The paper provides a framework for the assessment and optimization of the total risk of complex distributed systems. The framework takes into account the risk of each agent, which may arise from heterogeneous sources, as well as the risk…