Related papers: Bayesian Persuasion with Selective Disclosure
We study a cheap-talk game where two experts first choose what information to acquire and then offer advice to a decision-maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. The experts cannot commit to reporting strategies. Yet, we show that…
We study the problem of selling information to a data-buyer who faces a decision problem under uncertainty. We consider the classic Bayesian decision-theoretic model pioneered by [Blackwell, 1951, 1953]. Initially, the data buyer has only…
We study the consequences of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in settings with multiple independent agents. We model an interaction between a Sender, who holds vital private information but cannot act, and a Receiver, who…
I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score. Based on the score, the receiver makes a decision. The…
Contemporary scientific research is a distributed, collaborative endeavor, carried out by teams of researchers, regulatory institutions, funding agencies, commercial partners, and scientific bodies, all interacting with each other and…
We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct''…
So far, the theory of equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is insensitive to communication possibilities. To address this issue, we incorporate the assumption that communication reduces -- but does not…
Cheng (2025) establishes that in a persuasion game where both the sender and the receiver have Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) preferences, the sender never strictly benefits from using ambiguous communication strategies over standard…
In this paper we design information elicitation mechanisms for Bayesian auctions. While in Bayesian mechanism design the distributions of the players' private types are often assumed to be common knowledge, information elicitation considers…
The secrecy of a communication system in which both the legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper are allowed some distortion is investigated. The secrecy metric considered is the exponent of the probability that the eavesdropper estimates…
When multiple informative equilibria are possible in a general cheap talk game, how much information can a principal guarantee herself? To answer this question, I define the notion of worst-case implementation-implementation via the worst…
When releasing outputs from confidential data, agencies need to balance the analytical usefulness of the released data with the obligation to protect data subjects' confidentiality. For releases satisfying differential privacy, this balance…
Many resources for forensic scholars and practitioners, such as journal articles, guidance documents, and textbooks, address how to make a value of evidence assessment in the form of a likelihood ratio (LR) when deciding between two…
I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…
We study a model of information aggregation and social learning recently proposed by Jadbabaie, Sandroni, and Tahbaz-Salehi, in which individual agents try to learn a correct state of the world by iteratively updating their beliefs using…
A benevolent advisor observes a project's complexity and posts a pass - fail threshold before the agent chooses effort. The project succeeds only if ability and effort together clear complexity. We compare two informational regimes. In the…
This paper brings the novel idea of paying the utility to the winning agents in terms of some physical entity in cooperative communications. Our setting is a secret two-way communication channel where two transmitters exchange information…
We study strategic information transmission in a hierarchical setting where information gets transmitted through a chain of agents up to a decision maker whose action is of importance to every agent. This situation could arise whenever an…
We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We fully characterize the optimal proposal and experiment when Vetoer has quadratic loss,…
Consider a pair of random variables $(X,Y)$ distributed according to a given joint distribution $p_{XY}$. A curator wishes to maximally disclose information about $Y$, while limiting the information leakage incurred on $X$. Adopting mutual…