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To be successful in multi-player drone racing, a player must not only follow the race track in an optimal way, but also compete with other drones through strategic blocking, faking, and opportunistic passing while avoiding collisions. Since…
Particle swarm optimization (PSO) is a widely used nature-inspired meta-heuristic for solving continuous optimization problems. However, when running the PSO algorithm, one encounters the phenomenon of so-called stagnation, that means in…
In this paper, we delve into the problem of using monetary incentives to encourage players to shift from an initial Nash equilibrium to a more favorable one within a game. Our main focus revolves around computing the minimum reward required…
This paper provides theoretical bounds for empirical game theoretical analysis of complex multi-agent interactions. We provide insights in the empirical meta game showing that a Nash equilibrium of the meta-game is an approximate Nash…
Finite-horizon probabilistic multiagent concurrent game systems, also known as finite multiplayer stochastic games, are a well-studied model in computer science due to their ability to represent a wide range of real-world scenarios…
While Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, they may exhibit dense support, making them difficult to understand and execute in some applications. In this paper, we study $k$-sparse commitments in games where one player is restricted to…
We study reinforcement learning for two-player zero-sum Markov games with simultaneous moves in the finite-horizon setting, where the transition kernel of the underlying Markov games can be parameterized by a linear function over the…
In recent years, trust region on-policy reinforcement learning has achieved impressive results in addressing complex control tasks and gaming scenarios. However, contemporary state-of-the-art algorithms within this category primarily…
Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…
Automated verification techniques for stochastic games allow formal reasoning about systems that feature competitive or collaborative behaviour among rational agents in uncertain or probabilistic settings. Existing tools and techniques…
Pseudo-games are a natural and well-known generalization of normal-form games, in which the actions taken by each player affect not only the other players' payoffs, as in games, but also the other players' strategy sets. The solution…
We study offline learning in KL-regularized two-player zero-sum games, where policies are optimized with respect to a fixed reference policy through KL regularization. Prior work relies on pessimistic value estimation to handle distribution…
Adversarial team games model multiplayer strategic interactions in which a team of identically-interested players is competing against an adversarial player in a zero-sum game. Such games capture many well-studied settings in game theory,…
Policy-based methods with function approximation are widely used for solving two-player zero-sum games with large state and/or action spaces. However, it remains elusive how to obtain optimization and statistical guarantees for such…
In interactive multi-agent settings, decision-making and planning are challenging mainly due to the agents' interconnected objectives. Dynamic game theory offers a formal framework for analyzing such intricacies. Yet, solving constrained…
In this paper we consider the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash Equilibrium of a zero-sum game in a payoff matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ with $O(1)$-bounded entries given access to a matrix-vector product oracle…
Multi-time scale techniques, such as singular perturbations and averaging theory, have played an essential role in the development of distributed Nash equilibrium-seeking algorithms for network systems. Such techniques intrinsically rely on…
We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…
We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…
We study the problem of achieving decentralized coordination by a group of strategic decision makers choosing to engage or not in a task in a stochastic setting. First, we define a class of symmetric utility games that encompass a broad…