Related papers: Coordinated Multi-Domain Deception: A Stackelberg …

Cyber warfare has become a central element of modern conflict, especially within multi-domain operations. As both a distinct and critical domain, cyber warfare requires integrating defensive and offensive technologies into coherent…

Reconnaissance activities precedent other attack steps in the cyber kill chain. Zero-day attacks exploit unknown vulnerabilities and give attackers the upper hand against conventional defenses. Honeypots have been used to deceive attackers…

Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with the leader's incomplete knowledge about the follower's…

Recent incidents such as the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack and the SolarWinds hack have shown that traditional defense techniques are becoming insufficient to deter adversaries of growing sophistication. Proactive and deceptive…

This paper addresses a significant gap in Autonomous Cyber Operations (ACO) literature: the absence of effective edge-blocking ACO strategies in dynamic, real-world networks. It specifically targets the cybersecurity vulnerabilities of…

Cyberattacks on both databases and critical infrastructure have threatened public and private sectors. Ubiquitous tracking and wearable computing have infringed upon privacy. Advocates and engineers have recently proposed using defensive…

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) play an increasingly significant role in many critical applications. These valuable applications attract various sophisticated attacks. This paper considers a stealthy estimation attack, which aims to modify…

Multi-sensor integration via error-state Kalman filter (KF) is widely employed for precise state estimation in cyber-physical systems (CPSs). However, this integration exposes the system to stealthy deception attacks that render…

In security games, the solution concept commonly used is that of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the defender gets to commit to a mixed strategy. The motivation for this is that the attacker can repeatedly observe the defender's actions and…

It has been demonstrated that adversarial graphs, i.e., graphs with imperceptible perturbations, can cause deep graph models to fail on classification tasks. In this work, we extend the concept of adversarial graphs to the community…

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) have created new security challenges for critical infrastructures due to their stealthy, dynamic, and adaptive natures. In this work, we aim to lay a game-theoretic foundation by establishing a multi-stage…

We introduce a novel framework for computing optimal randomized security policies in networked domains which extends previous approaches in several ways. First, we extend previous linear programming techniques for Stackelberg security games…

This paper introduces a differentially private (DP) mechanism to protect the information exchanged during the coordination of sequential and interdependent markets. This coordination represents a classic Stackelberg game and relies on the…

The adoption of reinforcement learning for critical infrastructure defense introduces a vulnerability where sophisticated attackers can strategically exploit the defense algorithm's learning dynamics. While prior work addresses this…

Rooted in collaborative efforts, cybersecurity spans the scope of cyber competitions and warfare. Despite extensive research into team strategy in sports and project management, empirical study in cyber-security is minimal. This gap…

We study the security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) in the context of the supervisory control layer. Specifically, we propose a general model of a CPS attacker in the framework of discrete event systems and investigate the problem of…

The present survey aims at presenting the current machine learning techniques employed in security games domains. Specifically, we focused on papers and works developed by the Teamcore of University of Southern California, which deepened…

The Stackelberg game model, where a leader commits to a strategy and the follower best responds, has found widespread application, particularly to security problems. In the security setting, the goal is for the leader to compute an optimal…

Previous research has shown that federated learning (FL) systems are exposed to an array of security risks. Despite the proposal of several defensive strategies, they tend to be non-adaptive and specific to certain types of attacks,…

Deception is virtually ubiquitous in warfare, and should be a central consideration for military operations research. However, studies of agent behaviour in simulated operations have typically neglected to include explicit models of…