Related papers: Coordinated Multi-Domain Deception: A Stackelberg …

Attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS) which manipulate sensor readings can cause enormous physical damage if undetected. Detection of attacks on sensors is crucial to mitigate this issue. We study supervised regression as a means to…

In this paper, a general model for cyber-physical systems (CPSs), that captures the diffusion of attacks from the cyber layer to the physical system, is studied. In particular, a game-theoretic approach is proposed to analyze the…

We are currently facing unprecedented cyber warfare with the rapid evolution of tactics, increasing asymmetry of intelligence, and the growing accessibility of hacking tools. In this landscape, cyber deception emerges as a critical…

Stackelberg security games are a critical tool for maximizing the utility of limited defense resources to protect important targets from an intelligent adversary. Motivated by green security, where the defender may only observe an…

Anticipating the strategies of potential attackers is crucial for protecting critical infrastructure. We can represent the challenge of the defenders of such infrastructure as a Stackelberg security game. The defender must decide how to…

This paper investigates the strategic concealment of environment representations used by players in competitive games. We consider a defense scenario in which one player (the Defender) seeks to infer and exploit the representation used by…

The field of cybersecurity has mostly been a cat-and-mouse game with the discovery of new attacks leading the way. To take away an attacker's advantage of reconnaissance, researchers have proposed proactive defense methods such as Moving…

Stackelberg Security Games are often used to model strategic interactions in high-stakes security settings. The majority of existing models focus on single-defender settings where a single entity assumes command of all security assets.…

The existing network attack and defense method can be regarded as game, but most of the game only involves network domain, not multiple domain cyberspace. To address this challenge, this paper proposed a multiple domain cyberspace attack…

As assembly tasks grow in complexity, collaboration among multiple robots becomes essential for task completion. However, centralized task planning has become inadequate for adapting to the increasing intelligence and versatility of robots,…

Modern cyber attacks unfold through multiple stages, requiring defenders to dynamically prioritize mitigations under uncertainty. While game-theoretic models capture attacker-defender interactions, existing approaches often rely on static…

One prominent security threat that targets unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is the capture via GPS spoofing in which an attacker manipulates a UAV's global positioning system (GPS) signals in order to capture it. Given the anticipated…

Socio-technical networks represent emerging cyber-physical infrastructures that are tightly interwoven with human networks. The coupling between human and technical networks presents significant challenges in managing, controlling, and…

We present a model for layered security with applications to the protection of sites such as stadiums or large gathering places. We formulate the problem as one of maximizing the capture of illegal contraband. The objective function is…

Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But…

This paper investigates the problem of synthesizing proactive defense systems in which the defender can allocate deceptive targets and modify the cost of actions for the attacker who aims to compromise security assets in this system. We…

Defensive deception techniques have emerged as a promising proactive defense mechanism to mislead an attacker and thereby achieve attack failure. However, most game-theoretic defensive deception approaches have assumed that players maintain…

We develop an analytical Stackelberg game framework for optimal resource allocation in a sequential attacker--defender setting with a finite set of assets and probabilistic attacks. The defender commits to a mixed protection strategy, after…

In Stackelberg security games when information about the attacker's payoffs is uncertain, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal defender commitment by interacting with the attacker and observing their best responses. In this…

The rapid expansion of Internet use has increased system exposure to cyber threats, with advanced persistent threats (APTs) being especially challenging due to their stealth, prolonged duration, and multi-stage attacks targeting high-value…